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This dissertation studies issues of imperfect and dynamic competition taking as motivation
strategic interaction in the United States paper industry. The components of this work focus on
both theoretical and empirical issues that arise in asymmetric oligopoly markets more generally.
The first chapter considers that when consumers recycle a good, the future supply of interme-
diate inputs increases. If some of the inputs are used to manufacture a good that competes with the
original good, the initial seller faces an incentive to reduce its supply to limit this source of future
competition. I illustrate this incentive in a model of dynamic oligopoly, and test the predictions
using data from the US paper industry between 1973 and 1993. I find that firms decrease quan-
tity in response to policy changes that increase competition from firms using the recycled input.
I then use the model to illustrate two implications: (i) the response to strategic incentives may
lead antitrust authorities to underestimate the exercise of pre-merger market power, and horizon-
tal mergers let firms internalize their effects on future competition, resulting in a greater supply
reduction post-merger; and (ii) the policy trade-off between reducing harms from pollution and
reducing the exercise of market power under oligopoly is sharper when firms respond to dynamic
incentives.
In the second chapter, I develop a tractable oligopoly model that preserves many of the predic-
tions of the dominant firm model. Antitrust policy looks with skepticism on dominant firms as they
are in position to leverage the position into higher profits at the expense of consumers and rival
firms. I show the equilibrium price is higher and market share of the dominant firm is smaller in
the dominant firm model in comparison to my oligopoly model. This suggests that the assumption
on supply side strategic behavior are important for market outcomes. When the number of leaders
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is endogenous, more firms enter when rivals are price-takers. This result suggests barriers to entry
must be high to sustain dominant market structures.
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CHAPTER 1
THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF RECYCLING ON OLIGOPOLY COMPETITION: EVIDENCE
FROM THE US PAPER INDUSTRY
1.1 Introduction
A firm with market power may forgo current profits to alter future competition.1 When con-
sumers recycle a good, the future supply of intermediate inputs increases. If some of these inputs
are used to create a good that competes with the initial good, this intertemporal link creates an
incentive for the original producer to reduce supply below the optimal static level to limit future
competition. In markets with many original sellers, a supply reduction by one of these firms also
benefits the others in the future. Therefore, firms face a weaker incentive to reduce supply in an
oligopoly than in a market with a single original seller.
The US paper industry provides a natural setting to study the dynamic effects caused by recy-
cling on oligopoly competition. This industry includes two types of strategic firms: primary firms
that produce only from virgin wood, and secondary firms that produce only from recycled paper.
Between 1970 and 2015 the consumer paper recycling rate increased from 25% to 67%, resulting
in a significant increase in the availability of the recycled input to the secondary firms. This in-
crease in recycling changed the competitive landscape with the percentage of total paper supplied
by primary firms declining from 76% in 1970 to 48% in 2015.
My analysis proceeds in 3 steps. First, I develop a theoretical model of dynamic oligopoly
competition with a recyclable good and use this model to generate empirically testable hypotheses.
I then use data on the US paper industry to test whether primary firms reduce their quantity supplied
in response to incentives created by increased competition from secondary firms. Finally, I use the
1Shapiro (1989) and Besanko, Doraszelski, and Kryukov (2017) discuss a wide range of models that feature this
incentive. Examples include behavior that lowers a firm’s own marginal costs, such as R&D spending and learning by
doing, and behavior that creates product differentiation, such as switching costs and network effects.
model to illustrate and quantify the implications of the model’s incentives on equilibrium outcomes
of policy interventions.
I illustrate the strategic incentives faced by firms using a dynamic oligopoly model that captures
key features of the US paper industry. The key assumptions of the model are: (i) primary firms are
harmed by secondary firms’ supply, and (ii) an increase in one period’s quantity supplied lowers
secondary firms’ future marginal costs. The combination of these forces causes primary firms to
reduce quantity supplied below the levels that static, strategic incentives would imply.2 When there
are multiple primary firms in a market, an individual firm bears the full opportunity cost, in terms
of forgone profits, of reducing its supply in a given period. However, all primary firms share the
benefit of softer future competition. This externality between primary firms weakens the incentive
for an individual primary firm to reduce quantity supplied relative to the previous literature in
which only a single primary firm sold new goods in the market.
To test the hypotheses of the model, I construct a unique dataset on each paper mill in the
United States operating between 1973 and 1993. These data let me both identify mills as either
primary or secondary, and calculate these mills’ quantity supplied. These two pieces of information
let me match the empirical outcome to the theoretical predictions. I also collect information on
government policies, demand and cost factors, and data on regional recycling markets. These
variables let me account for other factors that more fully describe supply behavior. Finally, I control
for technological differences that existed across paper products during this sample period that made
the intensity of secondary competition differ across products in my empirical specification.
I organize the data such that the fundamental unit of observation is a primary firm manufactur-
ing a specific paper product in a given state and year. My regression specifications use variables
that influence the intensity of competition from the secondary firms as the key covariates of interest,
and I take the primary firm’s quantity supplied as the outcome of interest. I test the hypotheses of
the model by investigating (i) whether firms respond to more intense competition from secondary
2Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) provide a taxonomy of dynamic incentives that my model fits into. In particular, (i)
implies downward sloping best response functions and (ii) implies more supply today makes rival firms stronger in the
future. Hence, my model is an example of their “lean and hungry look.”
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firms in the contemporaneous period, and (ii) whether primary firms account for the intertempo-
ral link between current supply and more intense future competition when strategically setting
quantity.
I use several key sources of variation in the empirical analysis. The first source comes from
state subsidies for secondary firms. These subsidies incentivize secondary firms to increase supply,
making these firms more intense competitors. A primary firm should respond to this increased
competition by reducing its current supply. The enactment of these subsidies varied over time and
across states in response to time varying electorate preferences for environmental regulation. I
also exploit variation in the stock of recycled inputs. An increase in the stock directly decreases
secondary firms’ costs and should lead to a strategic reduction in primary quantity supplied. The
final source of variation comes from the consumer, paper recycling rate, which differs over time and
across regions. This rate responds to the opportunity cost of not recycling faced by the consumers
in each market. As the recycling rate increases, the future stock of recycled paper increases for any
given current supply, which lowers secondary firms’ future marginal costs. A strategic, forward-
looking primary firm must decrease its supply by a greater amount in the current period to achieve
the same amount of competition softening as a firm observing a lower rate. Therefore, primary
firms’ response to changes in the recycling rate provide variation in dynamic incentives.
In my regressions, I find that a 10% increase in the stock of recycled inputs results in a 0.9%
decrease in a primary firm’s quantity supplied. This result provides direct evidence that primary
firms reduce supply in response to a decrease in secondary firms’ contemporaneous marginal costs.
I also find that primary firms in a state with a subsidy law have lower quantity supplied than compa-
rable primary firms in states without a subsidy. These results provide further evidence that primary
firms reduce supply in response to more intense secondary competition in a given period. Further,
I find a 10% increase in the current recycling rate leads to a 2.7% reduction in a primary firm’s
quantity supplied. However, only primary firms that can directly affect the future competition from
the secondary sector through current supply do so. This response to the recycling rate provides ev-
idence that primary firms account for the future consequences of current strategic behavior. In
comparison, primary firms that cannot influence future competition through the recycling market
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only respond to static incentives.
I use the model to study the interaction between dynamic incentives and policy design through
a series of simulation exercises. For each exercise, I compare the solution of the dynamic model to
an alternative model in which firms behave myopically. I motivate these exercises using changes in
the paper industry that occurred during the sample period. The paper industry experienced a wave
of horizontal consolidation with the top four firms’ market share increasing from 20% to 51%. This
change in market structure motivates an exploration of the incentives for and equilibrium effects of
horizontal mergers in markets with dynamic incentives. I first simulate the model to study primary
firm markups and market concentration, and I compare the difference in these measures for the
case in which firms are forward-looking and myopic. The second set of simulations consider
equilibrium outcomes of an exogenous merger between primary firms in the model. The last
set of exercises focus on environmental policy towards the US paper industry. State and local
governments implemented several kinds of policies during the period aimed at the policy goal
of limiting environmental damages from primary production. I simulate a range of policies that
illustrate how the equilibrium outcome of different methods of influencing firms’ behavior are
affected by the dynamic, strategic incentives.
I find that primary firms exercise greater market power over a range of simulation exercises
when they respond to the dynamic incentive to soften future competition. For example, with one
primary and one secondary firm, the primary firm’s markup is 12% greater in the dynamic model
than in the myopic model. This result illustrates that the future competition softening incentive
leads to a reduction in current supply that raises both price and the primary firm’s markups. How-
ever, as the exercises consider markets with a greater number of primary firms, the difference in
markups between the dynamic and myopic model decrease. This decrease provides evidence of the
dynamic externality because other primary firms also benefit in the future from a supply reduction
by an individual firm, so an individual firm’s incentive to reduce current supply is reduced relative
to markets with a single primary firm. Combining these results provides a potential explanation
for the wave of mergers observed in the US paper industry during the 1980s. Internalizing the
dynamic competition softening incentive provides greater incentives for primary firms to merge in
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this setting. Because antitrust authorities that ignore the dynamic effects will also underestimate
the exercise of market power pre-merger, the authority will be more likely to approve mergers than
if it accounted for the dynamics. Because the antitrust authorities focused on the static, competitive
incentives during this time period, my model suggests the horizontal merger policy may have been
too permissive towards this industry during the sample.3
Horizontal mergers let primary firms internalize the competition softening effect of a supply
reduction. In my simulations, this internalization results in a long run reduction in supply that
is 25% greater in the dynamic relative than in the myopic model. Therefore, standard antitrust
analysis also underestimates anti-competitive behavior by ignoring the internalization of the dy-
namic competition softening incentive. In the long run, the quantity reduction by the merged firms
successfully raises the secondary firms’ input costs, leading the primary firms to exercise greater
market power in the long run. Consumer surplus decreases by a 25% greater amount in the long
run in the dynamic model.
I also simulate government policies to study the effectiveness of these policies in shifting pro-
duction away from the more environmentally damaging primary production. Exercises that impose
the subsidy observed in the empirical setting show these policies are more effective at reducing pri-
mary supply in the dynamic model. The greater reduction occurs because primary firms recognize
the subsidy makes competition from secondary firms more intense in both the current and fu-
ture periods. Thus, forward-looking primary firm reduces current supply to partially offset future
competition. I show that increasing the recycling rate can be a more effective policy in reducing
primary supply. Doubling the recycling rate leads to a short run reduction of primary quantity by
19% in the dynamic model but does not affect the myopic model. The difference between the mod-
els is that increasing the recycling rate makes it more difficult for the primary firms to soften future
competition. Therefore, the primary firm must decrease its current supply by a greater amount in
a given period to soften future competition and forgoes more profits. In response to both policy
3“the post-acquisition HHI is well below the critical level...the evidence herein fails to establish that the acquisi-
tion may substantially lessen competition” Federal Trade Commission (1985) acquisition of Manasha Corporation by
Weyerhauser.
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exercises, the total quantity supplied decreases by a greater amount in the dynamic model because
of the primary firms’ strategic response. The result of these exercises suggest that policy can
more effectively eliminate the environmental harms from production when firms are strategic and
forward-looking. However, the strategic supply reduction by primary firms result in a contraction
of total supply and greater exercise of market power.
My work contributes to several strands of literature. My theoretical model relates to work
used to study the dynamic supply problem of Alcoa based on the famous antitrust ruling of Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Alcoa (1945). These models generate similar intertemporal sup-
ply incentives as created by durable goods and resale markets.4 Gaskins (1974), Swan (1980), and
Martin (1982) consider models in which a dominant firm producing from virgin inputs competes
against a competitive fringe that recycles the good. I differ by considering multiple primary firms
and allowing secondary firms to exercise market power. The modeling extension lets me analyze
the how dynamic incentives interact with changes in market structure.
Several other authors have developed models that explore the dynamic effects of recycling on
oligopoly competition. Their work focus on the primary firm’s foreclosure incentive (Hollander
and Lasserre (1988) and Samba (2017)) or assume firms can commit to supply paths (Gaudet
and Long (2003) and Sourisseau, Beir, and Ha-Huy (2017)). My work differs by focusing on
competition softening incentives without assuming firms can commit to strategies, which lets me
study endogenous responses to policy changes.5
I also contribute to the analysis of the incentives for and equilibrium effects of horizontal
mergers by focusing on how the dynamic incentives caused by recycling interact with mergers.
I find the dynamic externality between primary firms make horizontal mergers between these firms
more likely, with or without impacts on marginal costs as in Perry and Porter (1985) and Salant,
4The result that a monopolist creates its own competition by selling a durable good creating a dynamic pricing
problem was proposed in Coase (1972). Other important contributions to this literature include Stokey (1981), Bulow
(1982), Bulow (1986), and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986). See Waldman (2007) and the references therein
for a survey of this literature.
5Belleflamme and Ha (2018) is the closest model to mine although they only let oligopoly competition occur in the
second period.
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Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) respectively. The post-merger quantity reduction is also greater in
my setting suggesting that mergers are more harmful to consumers, so standard merger evaluation
that ignores this channel can be too permissive.6 Designing merger policy to deal with these
dynamic effects is still a relatively new area of study. Nocke and Whinston (2010) and Nocke and
Whinston (2013) study policy with endogenous mergers, and Gowrisankaran (1999) studies how
dynamic mergers affect other dynamic outcomes. In comparison to these papers, I focus on the
incentives for and equilibrium impact of exogenous mergers under a specific dynamic incentive to
illustrate the consequences of ignoring dynamics.
Researchers have also explored the effect of recycling on firm behavior with either a domi-
nant firm or perfect competition. Suslow (1986) provides an empirical study of Alcoa’s supply
problem based on the previous theoretical literature. Sigman (1995) examines how different pol-
icy instruments affect equilibrium outcomes in the competitive lead battery industry. I consider
how strategic behavior interacts with environmental policy in a dynamic setting. This extension is
necessary to think about the interaction between strategic incentives and policy designed to limit
environmental harms.7
My work also contributes to the analysis of competition in the US paper industry. Pesendorfer
(2003) and Christensen and Caves (1997) focus on cost synergies from horizontal mergers and
whether mills use capacity expansion announcements as cheap talk, respectively. Hervani (2005)
studies the newsprint industry. He provides evidence that secondary firms have market power in
purchasing recycled inputs but only considers static incentives.
Finally, the theoretical incentives I identify relate to analysis of competition across markets.
I study a case in which firms’ strategic incentives are influenced by competitive concerns over
time. My model is a specific example of the framework developed by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and
Klemperer (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). I use recycling as a new channel to generate
6Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Whinston (2007) provide a more detailed discussion of the welfare impacts of
horizontal mergers. These authors’ results illustrate how accounting for gains from firms not involved in the merger
may be large enough to counteract the loss in consumer surplus.
7By considering dynamics I also illustrate a dynamic version of the trade-off between eliminating environmental
damages and eliminating the exercise of market power such as demonstrated in Barnett (1980).
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these strategic incentives in a dynamic oligopoly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I provide a discussion of the data and industry in
section 1.2. Section 1.3 discusses the theoretical model and derives the implication of the model.
In section 1.4, I develop, estimate and discuss the empirical specifications. Section 1.5 setups and
discusses the results of the simulation exercises. I conclude in section 2.5.
1.2 Industry Background and Data
1.2.1 Paper Industry Background
Firms in the paper industry manufacture a collection of products. I follow industry sources and
divide final products into mutually exhaustive categories such that within each category the good
is homogeneous.8 Production takes place at mills that transform the necessary intermediate input,
pulp, into paper. Production capacity is limited by the mill’s number of paper machines, which are
the key piece of capital equipment needed to create paper. Industry sources report that mills must
incur a large, sunk cost to purchase new machines or expand capacity. These sunk costs provide
incentives for mills to operate near full capacity and represent a significant barrier to entry.
Two sources of pulp combined to account for 99% of all inputs during my sample period.
The first is virgin wood. Firms harvest timber and then apply heat and chemicals to turn virgin
wood into pulp. The second source is recycled paper. This paper is collected from consumers and
transformed back into pulp by combining the paper with water and chemicals.
The amount of inputs needed to produce a product differs depending on which type of pulp
the mill uses. Farla, Blok, and Schipper (1997) surveyed paper mills across developed countries
and found that primary mills required between 2.5 and 6 gigajoules of electricity per ton of paper
manufactured while secondary mills required approximately 1.4 gigajoules per ton of paper. Ince
(1993) also estimated differences in labor intensity with a ton of newsprint requiring 0.46 labor
hours at a primary mill but only 0.13 labor hours at a secondary mill.
The paper industry also generates several kinds of environmental damages. This industry ac-
counted for approximately 15% of US industrial energy usage in 2001 (US Department of Energy,
8Ince, Li, Zhou, Buongiorno, and Reuter (2001) provide a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences
both within and between product categories.
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2005). Hence, some of the harms from production arise from damages associates with this en-
ergy usage. Producing from secondary inputs instead of primary inputs is estimated to greatly
reduce this energy usage.9 The chemicals used to manufacture paper also harm water quality and
are regulated under the Clean Water Act (1972). Finally, paper made up the plurality of tonnage
in municipal solid waste (MSW) facilities (Franklin Associates, 1988). Government agencies dis-
cussed how policies aimed at both encouraging the use of secondary paper and increasing recycling
provided an added benefit of limiting harms originating from MSW facilities.10
1.2.2 Mill Level Data
I combine two mill-level datasets to study the effects of recycling on oligopoly competition.
The first is the Lockwood Post Directory (LP), an industry source that collected annual data from
each paper mill operating in the US. This information includes the mill’s paper capacity level, the
location of the mill, specific capital equipment owned at the mill, the corporate owner of the mill,
and other information. The second source comes from United States Department of Agriculture’s
Forest Product Laboratory (FPL). The FPL data provides the specific paper product manufactured
at each mill, and the share of each product produced from primary and secondary inputs. I collect
data from these sources each year between 1973 and 1993.11
I create my sample of 546 mills by matching mills between the two data sources. This process
drops approximately 300 mills from the LP dataset. The mills excluded from the sample are
composed of two specific types of mills. The first are 40 pulp mills that did not manufacture paper
so did not compete in the relevant product market. The second set of excluded mills manufactured
construction board. FPL did not collect data on input usage from these mills, so I was unable
to construct a measure of input usage for these mills. Construction board is intended for long-
life cycles and is mainly sold to the construction industry. In comparison, the paper products
included in the sample are sold for a single use to households and businesses. Therefore, the
9A special report on recycling estimated that producing paper from recycled instead of virgin inputs reduced energy
usage by 40%. The Economist, “The truth about Recycling” June 7th 2007.
10See EPA (1988) and OTA (1989) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
11The FPL data is missing outside this period.
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time horizon and demand characteristics differ significantly between these types of mills. The
construction board industry also experienced significant exit over this sample period, creating an
issue for isolating the dynamic effects created by recycling from other dynamic incentives.12
Primary firms accounted for the majority of supply over the sample period. A similar pattern
holds at the mill level with primary mills averaging 450 tons of paper per day while secondary
mills averaging 125 tons per day.13 Most primary production occurred at vertically integrated
mills while secondary mills purchased inputs from independent wholesalers. Plant and Steiker
(1978) suggests that vertical integration created returns to scale in primary production providing an
efficiency advantage. Integration along the supply chain also let primary firms eliminate successive
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Figure 1.1: Difference in supply by input used between final product categories. Cardboard boxes
(Left) and Printing Paper (Right).
A further source of heterogeneity in the paper industry comes from consumers’ preference
for primary products arising from aesthetic qualities of the products.14 For example 21.1% of
cardboard boxes were manufactured from secondary inputs in 1975 while only 6.7% of printing
paper was. These differences also exist over time with Figure 1.1 showing that the supply was flat
12A third of the construction paper mills manufactured roofing materials, which used asbestos based inputs. These
mills experience a large, negative demand shock as the health risks of asbestos became widely understood.
13This difference in capacity also holds across the distribution of capacity with the likelihood that a given mill uses
primary inputs increases as the capacity of the mill increases.
14For example consumers care about the brightness of printing paper, a characteristic that primary inputs are better
at producing, while consumers derive little utility from the appearance of cardboard boxes that are used for shipping.
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or declining for primary cardboard boxes but increasing for primary printing paper. In comparison,
these trends are reversed for the secondary supply of these two paper products. Ince (1993) showed
that the technological ability to produce paper from recycled input also differed across products.
For example, the technology to transform recycled cardboard boxes into new cardboard was in
widespread use while it was impossible to transform used tissue paper into new tissues during
this period. These technological differences create cross-sectional variation in competition across
products. An increase in current supply by primary firms for which this technology exists leads to a
direct increase in future competition while this channel does not exist for firms not exposed. Thus,
the dynamic, strategic incentives differs for similar firms that produce different finished products.
Table 1.1: Mill-Product Level Summary Statistics
Product Share Primary Avg. Capacity (tons) Share West Share Midwest Share Northeast # Mills Obs
Coated Freesheet 95% 306 5.6% 46.7% 26.1% 37 645
Coated Groundwood 100% 482 2.8% 38.1% 41.2% 21 360
Kraft Paper 70.7% 358 19.1% 11.2% 15.1% 42 597
Newsprint 75.1% 695 37.4% 8.8% 9.9% 29 476
Tissue Paper 38.3% 139 15.2% 22.6% 45.5% 123 1979
Uncoated Freesheet 85.5% 259 8.7% 36% 35.9% 122 2187
Uncoated Groundwood 88.7% 248 11.6% 24.4% 51.2% 27% 347
Special Paper 89.6% 96 4.6% 24.8% 51.3% 74 1398
Corrugating Medium 44.6% 333 18.7% 30.8% 14.3% 88 1245
Linerboard 64.4% 722 24.4% 15.7% 3.1% 84 1263
Solid Bleached Board 100% 726 11.8% 0% 0% 26 474
Recycled Paperboard 0% 143 10.2% 31.8% 38.6% 176 3078
Note: All calculations at the product-mill level. Share of primary calculated calculated from FPL data. For
approximately 80% of these observations, the mill level and product level are the same. I adjust the remaining
observations using the share of each product manufactured as weights.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics at the product-mill level for paper capacity, the share
of production using primary inputs, and the share of mills in each region of the country.15 These
statistics illustrate that the aggregate trends also hold at the product level because products that
use a greater share of primary inputs also have greater capacity. For most goods, the majority of
production at a given mill comes from primary inputs. There are exceptions for which secondary
accounts for the majority of the share of production such as corrugating medium and tissue paper.
15In the Appendix, I reproduce this table using the firm-product category as the unit of observation. The average
share of secondary production at this level of aggregation is similar while the average capacity level mechanically
increases because of the existence of multi-mill firms.
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Regional differences also exist across product categories. For example, most tissue paper mills
(45.5%) are located in the Northeast while the rest of the tissue paper mills are relatively evenly
spread across the other regions. This regional variation provides differences in demand, cost and
features of the recycling market that influence supply incentives.
1.2.3 Market Level Data
I next discuss trends in the recycling market that help provide variation in firms’ supply in-
centives. The amount of paper recycled increased from 15.2 million tons in 1973 to 35.5 million
tons in 1993 while the tons of recycled paper used as secondary inputs at paper mills increased
from 14.1 million to 28 million.16 The total supply of paper increased from 65 million tons to 91.6
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Figure 1.2: Total Paper Usage, Amount of Paper Recycled and Use of Recycled Inputs by Paper
Mills over Time
The share of paper produced from secondary inputs varied over the sample; however, this share
was essentially flat between 1973 and 1981, changing from 25% in 1973 to 24% in 1981. Starting
in 1981, state governments began implementing policy aimed at shifting production to secondary
16The total amount of paper recycled continued to increase after my sample period; however, the usage of the
secondary inputs at paper mills was relatively constant after the sample. The change in trends was driven by an
increase in exports to met growing demand from new paper mills built in Asia.
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firms. The share of paper produced from secondary inputs increased to 34% by 1993, Howard
and Jones (2016). The timing of the increase in the share of secondary production provides some
evidence that policy contributed to the shift in production. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
reported that annual state and local government expenditures on paper rose from $546 million to $4
billion over this time frame, illustrating that implementing these policies also involved significant
spending.
The major policy enacted during my sample involved subsidizing each ton of secondary paper
purchased by the government.17 I document the timing and level of subsidies in Table A.1 in the
Appendix. New York enacted the first subsidy in 1981 and starting in 1989 there was a rapid
increase in states enacting subsidies with 19 subsidies enacted between 1989 and 1993. In Figure
1.3, I illustrate the share of paper produced in states with a subsidy law. This figure illustrates that
large increases in the share covered came from both states that produce a large amount of paper,
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Figure 1.3: Share of Paper Covered by State Subsidy Laws over Time
Note: Based on author’s calculation using state subsidy laws, mill level production and share of products from
different inputs.
17Secondary firms receive a subsidy proportional to the price the government pays to primary firms in states with
these policies.
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Differences in government policy and the opportunity cost of recycling created variation in the
recycling rate across different regions of the US and over time as illustrated in Figure 1.4. Recy-
cling became more common over time in all regions. However, the level and trends for recycling
differ across regions. In markets in which consumers recycle a greater amount the future costs of
secondary firms are lower all else equal, so the dynamic supply incentives also depend on these
differences in recycling. I also collected other variables that influence recycling such as the time





















Figure 1.4: Consumer Recycling Rate over Time and Regions
I construct the stock of recycled inputs for each product using information from industry
sources. Each paper product uses a different combination of four types of recycled inputs: (i)
old newsprint, (ii) old corrugated cardboard, (iii) mixed paper, and (iv) high grade pulp substitutes.
The composition of each type of recycled inputs is a mixture of different final paper products. For
example, new newsprint is the only paper product that contributes to the stock of old newsprint,
and the only type of recycled input used by secondary newsprint mills is old newsprint. Thus, the
entire stock of recycled input for newsprint comes from previous supply of the product. At the
other extreme, tissue paper does not contribute to any of the recycled inputs, so the entire stock
of recycled input for tissue paper comes from the supply of other products. In Table A.3 in the
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Appendix, I display the input-output table used to construct the stock for each product.
Table 1.2: HHI by Final Product and Region
Product National HHI West HHI South HHI Midwest HHI North East HHI
Coated Paper 638 8509 3084 1446 2197
Kraft Paper 1067 4499 1568 4763 3620
Newsprint 922 2379 2015 7716 7649
Tissue Paper 1281 4581 5915 3630 2596
Uncoated Freesheet 508 5020 2549 1315 1378
Uncoated Groundwood 1490 7928 7985 5880 2868
Special Paper 628 5273 2894 1667 1557
Corrugating Medium 476 2511 1175 1558 3144
Linerboard 553 2501 773 4803 8928
Solid Bleached Board 1086 5249 1175 - -
Recycled Paperboard 388 1378 1067 575 503
Note: All calculations at the product level. Mill level capacity is adjusted for product. Ownership data constructed
from LP.
One concern given the number of firms in the US paper industry is that firms may not be able to
affect equilibrium outcomes. If firms instead behave as price takers, then changes in supply comes
only from changes in market primitives instead of strategic decisions. To investigate this possi-
bility, I calculate the HHI at both the national and regional level. My preferred market definition
takes the United States Forestry Service (USFS) regional definitions as the markets. I present the
results of these specifications in Table 1.2. At the national level the market is relatively unconcen-
trated but within regions concentration is higher. For example the Uncoated Freesheet market is
unconcentrated at the national level but is significant to highly concentrated in each region using
the definitions in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010).18
To provide empirical justification for the regional market definition, I calculate shipment flows
using the Public Micro Data from the 2012 Commodity Flow Survey (CFS).19 At least 70% of
shipments of paper originating at a mill in a specific region goes to a consumer within the same
18I return to the issue of firm concentration in section 1.5. The results in that section suggest that if anything the
observed HHI underestimates the exercise of market power.
19I compared these results to earlier shipment data in the 1967 and 1977 Census of Transportation. The flows for
the paper industry are similar over these time frames. I use the 2012 sample because it allows more detailed study of
trade patterns.
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region. While there are cross-regional shipments, the regional definitions appear reasonable given
the shipment data. I report the shipment information along with summary statistics of regional
data in the Appendix. These regional definitions also agree with those used by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in evaluating horizontal mergers, and industry price reports.20,21
1.3 A Theoretical Model of Dynamic Oligopoly Competition
1.3.1 Model Set Up
I develop a dynamic model of oligopoly competition for a good that consumers recycle. The
supply side of the industry is composed of 3 types of firms. The first are primary firms that use
virgin intermediate inputs. The second are price-taking recycling wholesalers. Wholesalers collect
the good from consumers and transform the recycled good into an intermediate input.22 The final
set of firms are secondary firms that purchase the recycled input from the wholesalers. Primary and
secondary firms move simultaneously with each firm, i, setting quantity qit ∈ R+ in each period t.
I model the demand side as a representative consumer. This consumer views the good as
homogeneous and has inverse demand based on the total quantity supplied, Qt =
∑
qit, given by
P (Qt). The consumer does not store the good and makes a myopic purchasing decision.23 I assume
the inverse demand function is continuous, decreasing, and concave in total quantity supplied.24
The price of the recycled input in period t depends on both the stock of the recycled input
carried over from the previous period, Q̄t−1, and the cost of using other inputs such as labor.
An increase in the stock leads to a shift out in the supply curve of the recycling wholesalers. A
20See the discussion about market boundary definitions in the proposed acquisition of Menasha Corporations’s
corrugated medium assets in Oregon by Weyerhauser in 1980, Federal Trade Commission (1985).
21There are separate reports for the Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, Pacific Northwest, Los Angeles, San Fransisco,
Buffalo, New York and New England these results are slightly finer that what I use in the model.
22The assumption that wholesalers are price takers is not necessary for the result; however, this assumption easies
the explication.
23A dynamic demand model would let consumers base purchase decisions on inventories and the expected price path
of the good. These incentives are not a major concern in the paper industry with most deliveries being “just-in-time”
to the consumers.
24This condition can be relaxed to allow for more general demand functions. In particular, the results will hold if
demand is convex provided that for each firm, i, P ′(qi + Q−i) + P ′′(qi + Q−i)qi < 0 where Q−i is the quantity
supplied by all other firms. This condition implies that the marginal revenue of each firm decreases as the aggregate
amount produced by other firms increases.
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sufficient condition for an increase in the stock to lower the cost of the recycled input is that the
marginal productivity of the other inputs increases in the stock.
There are M ≥ 1 primary firms. The cost for a primary firm, m, to supply a unit of the good
is Cm(qm), and this cost is increasing and convex in the quantity supplied by the firm. There are
N ≥ 1 secondary firms. The total cost of a secondary firm, n, to produce a unit of the good is
Cn(qn) = C̃n(qn) + R(
∑N
j=1 qj, Q̄t−1)qn. There are two parts of this cost: (i) the cost of using
inputs such as labor, C̃n(qn), and (ii) the cost of using the recycled input R(·)qn. I also assume
that Cn(qn) is increasing and convex in the quantity supplied by the firm. As total demand for the
recycled input increases, the price of this input increases. This assumption implies R1 ≥ 0 where
R1 is the derivative of the recycled input price with respect to the total secondary demand for this
input. The assumption that an increase in the stock of recycled input decreases its price implies
that R2 ≤ 0. I further assume that R1,2 ≤ 0, so the marginal change in input price from an increase
in secondary demand is decreasing in the stock of recycled input. Intuitively, the increase in supply
from an increase in the stock has a greater effect than the increase in demand, so the equilibrium
input price decreases from a small change in both stock and demand.
After consumers purchase the good in period t, they use and then recycle a share, ψt, of the
good. The consumer discards the rest of the good to a landfill. This consumer recycling decision
arises from a model of household behavior such as the one considered in Fullerton and Kinnaman









(1 − δ)Q̄t−1. The transition includes two terms. First the new inflows into the stock that lets the
recycling rate differ for the two types of firms.25 The stock also evolves based on the portion of the
stock carried over from the previous period that does not depreciate.
The flow profit of a firm i is given by
πit(qit, q−it; Q̄t−1) = P (Qt(Q̄t−1))qit − Ci(qit).
25This specification lets the actual recycling rate differ to account for the possibility that a portion of secondary
paper that consumers attempt to recycle cannot be recovered.
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Each firm’s payoff depends on its own action, qit, the actions of other firms, q−it, and the payoff
relevant state variable, Q̄t−1. To ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium in the static version of the
game, I assume |πi,i| >
∑
j 6=i |πi,j| ∀i, j, where subscripts denote derivatives with respect to the
supply of firm. I define the value of firm i recursively as
Vi(Q̄t−1) = max
qit
πit(qit, q−it; Q̄t−1) + βVi(Q̄t),
where β is the common discount rate used by all firms. I assume that firms play a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium and use strategies that only depend on the stock and whether the firm is a primary or
secondary firm.
1.3.2 Analysis of Firm Incentives
I next use the model to generate empirical predictions for the effect of recycling on firm behav-
ior in a dynamic oligopoly. A series of steps establish the result. I first show how firms’ supply
strategies change in response to variation in the stock of the recycled input. Then I show how
firms’ profits change as the stock changes. I combine these two results to show how the dynamic
incentive caused by recycling change firm strategies relative to a model without forward-looking
behavior.26
Proposition 1.3.1 As the stock of the recycled input increases, primary (secondary) firms reduce
(increase) equilibrium supply.
Proof 1.3.1 I derive the result for the case with a single firm of each type for illustrative purposes.
More general results can be derived at the expense of clarity of the proof. Applying the implicit
function theorem to the system of first order conditions gives
π1,1dqm + π1,2dqn + π1,3dQ̄ = 0
π2,1dqm + π2,2dqn + π2,3dQ̄ = 0
26I illustrate these results using specific functional forms that satisfy the conditions of the model in the Appendix.
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where the partial derivatives are with respect to qm, qn, and Q̄ respectively.










which exists under the assumption used to ensure uniqueness. π1,3 = 0 because the stock has no
direct effect on the primary firm’s profit. Thus, dqm/dQ̄ ≤ 0 because π2,3 ≥ 0, by the assumptions
on the cost of using the recycled inputs, and because quantities are strategic substitutes. dqn/dQ̄ ≥
0 because π1,1 ≤ 0 from the necessary condition for primary firm optimality.
The intuition for this result comes from the strategic substitutability of supply. An increase
in the stock of recycled inputs decreases the secondary firm’s marginal cost resulting in a shift
out in this firm’s best response function. The primary firm moves down its best response function
resulting in a strategic reduction in supply. The result that an increase in recycled inputs makes
competition more intense provides the first testable implication of the model.
Proposition 1.3.2 Aggregate supply increases as the stock of recycled input increases.
Proof 1.3.2 Rearranging the expressions used to sign the effect of stock on quantity shows that the
condition required for the result is |π1,1| > |π1,2| in the case with 1 primary and 1 secondary. This
is the condition assumed for uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result is that secondary firms react directly to the increase in the stock
while primary firms only strategically respond. Because the primary firm’s reaction function is
relatively flat, the strategic reduction by the primary firm is less than the direct supply increase by
the secondary firm.
I next establish how profits change as the stock of recycled inputs increases.
Proposition 1.3.3 Primary firms’ profit decrease as the stock of recycled inputs increases while
secondary firms’ profit increase.
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Proof 1.3.3 Consider the case of 1 primary and 1 secondary firm. The change in profit from a


















From the first order condition, the first term is zero and the last term is zero because the stock does
not enter the primary firm’s profit directly. Proposition 3.1 establishes the second term is negative.
Thus, the primary firm’s profit decreases as the stock increases.


















The first term is positive from proposition 3.1, the second zero from optimality and the third is
positive from the direct effect of stock of secondary profit. Combining these results establishes the
result for the secondary firm.
The intuition for this result is similar to how changes in the stock of the recycled input affect
firm supply. Primary firms reduce supply as the stock of the recycled inputs increase while sec-
ondary firms increase supply. Primary firms are supplying less, and proposition 3.2 establishes that
price decreases. The combination of the price and primary quantity supplied responses result in a
lower profit for the primary firm.
With the results for how firms react within a given period established, I next derive how the
dynamic incentives further affect firm behavior. For comparison, I consider a model in which
the firms do not account for how current supply affects future periods. I term this alternative the
myopic model and generate this benchmark by assuming that firms have β = 0.
Proposition 1.3.4 Relative to the myopic model, primary firms supply less in the model with dy-
namic effects, and secondary firms supply more for any given stock of recycled input.
Proof 1.3.4 I combine propositions 3.1-3.3 and assumptions on profits to establish this result. The
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problems of a firm in the dynamic and myopic models are
max
qit
πit(qit, q−it; Q̄t−1) + βVi(Q̄t) (D)
max
qit
πit(qit, q−it; Q̄t−1). (M)
There exists a vector of strategies q∗ that satisfy optimality for problem (M) for any given stock.
The first order condition for a firm in the dynamic model is







Consider a primary firm solving (D) starting at the optimal supply for (M). At this supply level, the
static F.O.C. equals zero while the dynamic effect is negative. From proposition 3.3, ∂Vi
∂Q̄
≤ 0 for a
primary firm because ∂π
i
∂Q̄
≤ 0 for a primary firm. Therefore the first order condition of (D) for a
primary firm is negative at q∗.
Consider a decrease in supply by the primary firm to q′i < q
∗
i . The value of the static F.O.C.
increases because profits are concave. The future stock of the recycled input decreases, so the value
for this firm also increases. Therefore, the first order condition of (D) strictly increases. The firm
can further reduce supply until the first order condition of D returns to zero. A similar argument
establishes that an increase in supply relative to q∗ restores the first order optimality condition for
the secondary firm.
The intuition for the behavior of the primary firms in this model involves the intertemporal
profit trade-off. By decreasing supply in the current period, the primary firm forgoes current profits
and supplies a quantity such that the marginal revenue of its last sale is greater than the marginal
cost of the unit. The reduction in current supply reduces the stock in the future and raises the future
cost of using the recycled input. The increase in cost softens future competition from secondary
firms allowing for greater primary profits in the future. Secondary firms realized by increasing
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production in the current period their future marginal costs decrease.27
Collecting the results of the theoretical model yields two empirically testable hypotheses. First,
an increase in the stock of recycled input increases contemporaneous supply of secondary firms,
and primary firms respond by strategically reducing contemporaneous supply. Second, forward-
looking primary firms reduce current supply to soften competition in comparison to myopic pri-
mary firms.
The strategic incentives identified in this theoretical model also depend on the number of firms
in the market. Relative to the dominant firm model that has been previously studied, the oligopoly
model introduces three sources of externalities. First, the Cournot externality that each firm does
not account for how a reduction in supply affects the profits of other firms, so total quantity sup-
plied is greater in an oligopoly relative to a monopoly. Second, there is an externality between
secondary firms because when a secondary firm increases input demand the price of the recycled
input increases for all these firms. Finally, there is a dynamic externality. If a primary firm de-
creases supply in the current period, other primary firms receive the benefit of the softer future
competition. This last externality illustrates the strategic reaction to dynamic effects is weaker in
the oligopoly model relative to a model with a single primary firm.
1.3.3 Extensions to the Theoretical Model
I discuss several differences from the baseline model introduced above that are important to
consider in the empirical analysis below. First, I study how the policy variation used in my empiri-
cal application interacts with firms’ incentives. I modify the model so that secondary firms receive
a proportional subsidy, s ≥ 0, on each unit sold. The flow profit of a secondary firm j becomes




27If secondary production instead reduces the future stock of the recycled input then the incentive for the secondary
firm is less clear and appears to depend on the current level of the stock. Secondary production would reduces the
future stock on net if it takes more than 1 ton of input to make a ton of paper, and less than paper made from recycled
inputs are not perfectly recyclable.
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Because this policy does not change the sign of πi,j for either type of firm, the strategic supply
incentives from the baseline model extend to the model with the subsidy. Therefore, the subsidy
policy observed in the data does not change the prediction on the dynamic incentives although
the magnitude of firms’ response may change. A similar argument to that used to establish firms’
response to an increase in the stock of the recycled input establishes that primary firms’ supply
and profit decrease in response to the introduction of a subsidy. Intuitively, the subsidy increases
secondary firms’ marginal revenues and shifts out these firms’ best response functions. This result
provides another testable implication that primary firms reduce supply in response to the enactment
of subsidies in a market.
In the theoretical model, I assumed that firms supply a single, isolated market. However, in
the paper industry transportation costs are low enough that trade between markets occurs when
arbitrage opportunities exist across markets. Trade between markets creates a concern because
states pay subsidies based on the location of final consumers not the location of mills. In the
Appendix, I use a model of regional trade based on Brander (1981) to illustrate that the dynamic
effects can also hold in a model that allows strategic firms to trade between markets.
My model also assumes that consumers view primary and secondary products as homogeneous;
however, consumer surveys provide evidence that consumers viewed primary goods as higher qual-
ity. These preferences create a degree of product differentiation and provide a further source of
competition softening. In the Appendix, I show conditions on demand systems exist such that the
dynamic effects hold when consumers view goods as differentiated.
The final extension accounts for the interaction between the dynamic effects caused by recycled
inputs and capacity constraints. Because capacity constraints limit rivals’ ability to respond to a
reduction in supply, the incentive to soften future competition created by recycling is dampened.
1.3.4 Implications for Policy Makers
I motivate the simulation exercises by exploring the implications of the model for policy mak-
ers. The first exercises relate to horizontal merger policy. Consider first the challenge of an antitrust
authority that has access to data on pre-merger market shares and attempts to infer the exercise of
market power. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) posit that rules based on the level and
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changes in concentration allow for inference on unobserved market power in homogeneous good
Cournot models. Using concentration provides a measure of conduct under Cournot competition
because there is a one-to-one mapping from the HHI to markups. See Shapiro (1989) for a detailed
discussion of this issue.
To see that this relationship changes in the dynamic model, I rewrite the first order condition
of a primary firm, i, as
LIi ≡










The first term on the right hand side gives the standard relationship between a firm’s markup and the
share weighted inverse elasticity of demand. Summing over all firms gives the relationship between
HHI and markups. From proposition 3.3, the addition of the dynamic term shows that primary
firms exercise greater market power when these firms account for dynamic incentives. Thus, using
only information on market shares and demand elasticity will lead antitrust authorities to conclude
that primary firms are behaving more competitively pre-merger. Because of this underestimate of
market power, antitrust authorities are likely to be too permissive in allowing mergers when these
dynamic incentives are important.
Another alternative way to illustrate this issue comes from examining the market share of firms
for the case in which primary firms have greater market share pre-merger.28 The supply reduction
by primary firms, which yields the greater markup discussed above, also reduce their market share
and increases secondary firms’ market share. Holding fixed the number of firms, these changes in
market shares imply that market share in the model with dynamic effects are a mean-preserving
reduction of the shares in the myopic model. Thus, the variance of market shares are lower in the
dynamic model. This result implies that the HHI will be lower in the model with dynamic effects
than without.29
28This case is more relevant for antitrust authorities for two reasons. First, most industries that feature similar
dynamic incentives are composed of large primary firms and small secondary firms. Second, the dynamic incentives
lead to anti-competitive quantity reductions by primary firms and pro-competitive increases by secondary firms.
29The last result derives from rewriting HHI as HHI = Nσ2 +Nµ2.
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Antitrust policy makers must also consider the equilibrium effect of horizontal mergers. Be-
cause oligopoly competition generates an externality between primary firms for softening future
competition, this spillover between firms provides additional incentives for firms to merge. The
internalization of the dynamic competition softening incentive leads to a greater reduction of quan-
tity post-merger in the dynamic model because these firms now account for the combined firms’
future profits when setting current strategies. Internalizing competition softening provides a further
incentive for primary firms to merge in the dynamic model.
The other major policy issue in the paper industry is the effectiveness of different instruments in
shifting production towards more environmentally friendly producers. To examine the motivation
for these policies, I consider the problem of the social planner. The planner chooses the quantities
of the primary and secondary goods accounting for consumer demand, the production technologies
and environmental damages created by primary production. I focus on the case in which primary
production creates a damage, D(
∑M
i=1 qi) ≥ 0, that is increasing and convex in primary supply.
For example this function can represent the damages associated with the greater energy usage by
primary mills. The total surplus in period t, in the case with 1 primary and 1 secondary firm, is
TS(q1t , q
2
t , Q̄t−1) =
∫ q1t +q2t
0
P (s)ds− C1(q1t )− C̃2(q2t )−R(q2t , Q̄t−1)−D(q1t ). (1.3)














τ + (1− δ)Q̄τ−1 and Q̄0 ≥ 0 given.
There are several differences between the planner’s problem and the Cournot model. The first
term in the planner’s problem is consumer surplus instead of the firms’ revenue. Thus, the planner
should produce a greater quantity in each period. The second difference is the planner also re-
moves purchasing power for the recycled input. Removing purchasing power gives the planner an
25
incentive to increase secondary supply. The third difference is the planner accounts for the environ-
mental damages. Addressing these damages gives the planner an incentive to reduce the primary
supply. Therefore, the planner produces a greater quantity than what occurs in the oligopoly, and
the planner has an incentive to produce a greater share of the secondary good. Whether the in-
centive to address the harms from market power or environmental damages is stronger, and hence
which policy instrument is preferred, depends on parameters of the models.
1.3.5 Model Assumptions and Discussion
Several assumptions of the theoretical model merit comment. First, I do not allow the primary
firms to collude in the model. Second, I consider the role of allowing strategic secondary firms.
Third, the implication of heterogeneous costs are considered. I also discuss whether alternative
methods of foreclosure are more profitable than strategic supply. Finally, I discuss how changes in
demand over time interact with these incentives.
While I focus on equilibrium behavior that is only a function of the stock in the model, antitrust
authorities are also concerned about the ability of firms to collude using strategies that account for
the entire history of play. This alternative instead focuses on the subgame perfect equilibrium,
and admits trigger strategies with the equilibrium discussed above as the punishment. While the
analysis of this situation is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the dynamics of
the stock process may make collusion easier. That is, when a primary firm cheats on the collusive
agreement, the punishment stage of the game begins in a state of the world with a higher stock.
For any given discount factor, this fact implies the payoff from deviating is lower than without
dynamics. Thus, the model suggests that it may be easier to sustain collusion in the dynamic
model.
Another comparison to previous work involves considering the implications of letting the sec-
ondary firms exercise market power instead of constraining these firms to be price takers as nor-
mally assumed. The main difference caused by instead assuming the secondary firms are non-
strategic is that they do not account for the effect of current supply on future stock. The strategic
behavior I add introduces two competing incentives that make signing the difference of this change
in behavior difficult. First, the purchasing power incentivizes the secondary firms to reduce supply
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to limit costs from production, so the expected change involves lower secondary supply. However,
secondary firms also have an incentive to increase current supply to influence future competition.
Thus, the equilibrium difference between these two models is not clear.
I also discuss which firms have greater incentives to respond to the dynamic incentives when
costs are heterogeneous. I illustrate these results following Perry and Porter (1985) by assuming
each firm i controls a different amount ki of the industry capacity. In this specification, I model
the cost of a firm i as Ci(qi, ki) = cqi + q2i /2ki. Under this assumption on costs, I can show
that a primary firm that holds a greater capacity is more responsive to the dynamic incentives.
Intuitively, a firm with greater capacity benefits by a greater amount from softer competition, so
this firms dynamic incentive is greater. This cost specification also lets me examine local mergers,
such as a reallocation of capital between the firms. There are two main results of interest for local
mergers. First, reallocations of share between primary firms from a symmetric setting, results in
a reduction in the supply of all firms except the primary firm that increased its share, an overall
reduction in equilibrium supply and an increase in equilibrium price. Second, a reallocation of
capacity from a secondary to a primary firm increases the supply of all firms accept the one losing
capacity, an increase in total supply and a reduction in price. The percentage increase in supply
of the larger secondary firm after the reallocation can be greater than the gain of primary firms
because of the advantage the secondary firm has in the input market.
In the model, I assume that the only strategic action that a firm can take is to reduce supply.
However, an alternative action that these firms can take is to purchase and then either shut down or
idle capacity from the secondary firms. To evaluate this possibility, I adopt the specification in the
above paragraph and consider the problem faced by a primary firm in this specification. A primary
firm will purchase ε > 0 units of secondary capacity if and only if
Vi(Q̄t−1,k)− A(ε) ≥ Vi(Q̄t−1,k′).
That is, the gain in the value of the firm from changing the distribution of capacity must outweigh
the cost of purchasing this capacity from the secondary sector, A(ε). While general conditions to
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compare this expressions do not exist, a similar dynamic externality exists, which suggests that
this strategy is likely not to hold. Notice, that with multiple primary firms, only the acquiring firm
bears the purchase price while the other firms receive the benefit of softer competition.
Finally, I assume that demand is constant over time in the model. Alternatively I can allow
the demand intercept to change over time and consider how this affects firms’ dynamic strategy.
If firms know that demand will grow (shrink) in the next period, then the firms’ response to the
dynamic incentive is stronger (weaker). For the case of growing demand, the primary firms have
stronger incentives because the future is relatively more valuable; thus, the opportunity of forgoing
profit today is lower leading to a stronger response. A more general model would require speci-
fying the firms’ beliefs about the evolution of the demand state; however, it seems intuitive that in
low demand states firms’ incentives will be stronger because the future will be more valuable on
average.
1.4 An Empirical Model of Primary Firm Response to Dynamic Incentives
1.4.1 Empirical Specification of Firm Behavior
To study the incentives identified in the theoretical model, I take a primary firm, i, producing a
final good, j, in state, s, and year, t, as the unit of observation in the empirical specification. I use
firm level capacity as the dependent variable. This specification assumes that capacity proxies for
the firm’s quantity supplied. The assumption is reasonable in the paper industry because over the
sample period aggregate capacity utilization was approximately 90% for each paper product.30
The solution to the model yields an expression for equilibrium supply for firm i as:







Equation 1.4 specifies equilibrium quantity as a function of demand and cost parameters, Xit, the
subsidy for secondary firms, the stock of the recycled input, and how firms’ current supply affect
30I explore this assumption by regressing price on both aggregate capacity and the capacity utilization rate for each
final product category, and report the results of these regressions in Table A.4 in the Appendix. There is also a positive
and significant relationship between capacity and price across all products except kraft paper. For half the products
there is a positive and significant relationship between price and capacity utilization.
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future payoffs, ∂Vi/∂qit.
A complementary method to study the primary firms’ incentive involves studying best response






This specification lets the increase in competition from secondary firms affect primary quantity
supplied through movement along the best response function. Using the best response function
assumes the quantity of all other firms, Q−it, enters the problem directly, and that the subsidy and
stock variable only affect primary supply by changing total secondary quantity supplied.
I base the empirical test for primary firm responses to the incentives created by recycling on
regressions of the following form:
log qijst = α log Q̄jst−1 + βSubsidyst + γCompj + ζRecyclingst+
ξCCompjRecyclingst + Xijstη + εijst
(1.6)
This regression specification provides an approximation of the theoretical model considered in
equation 1.4, and preserves the predicted comparative statics from the theoretical model for the
variables of interest. I also include an indicator for exposure to competition from the secondary
firm that varies at the product level. Including this variable lets the quantity supplied decision differ
based on whether the firm can directly influence the future competition it faces from the secondary
sector. I proxy for forward-looking behavior using the current recycling rate. I group the remaining
sources of variation into the error term εijst.
The two testable hypotheses from the theoretical model are that (i) primary firms reduce quan-
tity supplied in response to more intense contemporaneous competition from the secondary sector,
and (ii) primary firms strategically reduce quantity to soften future competition. Empirically test-
ing the predictions of the theoretical model involves testing whether the coefficients on variables
that increase secondary competition in the current and future period are negative in regression
equation 1.6.
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Subsidy laws represent the first key source of variation in firms’ incentives. These laws in-
duce a direct increase in secondary firms’ quantity, and primary firms should strategically react
by reducing current quantity supplied. The second source of variation in incentives is the stock
of recycled inputs. As the stock increases, secondary firms’ marginal costs decrease, and primary
firms react by reducing quantity supplied. The regressions based on equilibrium quantity supplied,
equation 1.6, has the subsidy and stock enter the primary firm’s problem directly. In contrast, the
regressions based on best response specifications, equation 1.5, has the subsidy and stock only
affect primary behavior through their effect on the secondary firms supply. The paper recycling
rate provides the final source of variation. An increase in the recycling rate raises the future stock
of the recycled input for any total quantity supplied in the current period. Therefore, an increase in
the current recycling rate requires that a strategic, forward-looking firm reduces its current quantity
supplied by a greater amount to achieve the same amount of competition softening.
The empirical test of the hypothesis that primary firms decrease quantity supplied in response
to current competition is that the coefficient on the subsidy indicator, and the coefficient on the
current stock of recycled input are negative in equation 1.6. The empirical test of the response to
changes in future competition is that the indicator on the interaction between the recycling rate and
the indicator for secondary competition is negative. If this coefficient is negative but the coefficient
on the recycling rate alone is not, this is evidence that firms are forward-looking. Intuitively, firms
exposed to secondary competition have a direct ability to soften competition, so should react to
these forward-looking incentives. However, firms that cannot affect future competition should not
strategically respond to the changes in recycling rate.
To control for other incentives, I include time varying demand and cost variables. Because
there may still be unobservables that influence a firm’s decisions, I conduct the analysis with dif-
ferent sets of fixed effects. I include year fixed effects to control for aggregate shocks to all firm’s
supply problem. I include product fixed effects to account for time invariant unobservables that
affect incentives at the product level. For example, these fixed effects can capture consumers’ pref-
erence for primary over secondary products as reported in surveys during the period. I also include
state and market fixed effects to capture time invariant features of markets that influence strategic
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behavior. Finally, I include firm fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics of firms that
result in different quantity supplied.
1.4.2 Identification
Identification of the model’s prediction comes from firm response to exogenous variation that
affects strategic supply incentives over time. I require that the unobservable sources of variation
are conditionally independent after controlling for the variables in the regression. I discuss the
assumptions for identification below.
Theoretical models of the consumer recycling decision such as Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995)
show that the recycling rate responds to the opportunity cost of recycling a good. Because this
opportunity cost is set to address general concerns with landfill space, the recycling rate is inde-
pendent of the time varying unobservables in the firm’s quantity supplied problem.31 I construct
the stock variable for each product such that this variable varies across products and over time.
This construction also lets me create a variable that includes only the contributions to the stock
that come from the supply of other products. I use industry sources to construct an indicator for
whether a specific product was exposed to competition from the secondary industry.32 The def-
inition of the indicator is based on both whether the technological ability to manufacture from
recycled inputs was in widespread use at the start of the sample period.
The main threat to identification of the effect of the subsidy laws is that political economy con-
cerns led states to enact subsidies based on variables unobserved by the econometrician that also
affect firms’ decisions. Because subsidies harm primary firms and benefit secondary firms, firms
have incentives to lobby legislatures about the laws, so the outcome of the political process could
be correlated with strategic supply decisions. I use a duration model to estimate the probability
that a state that has not enacted a subsidy yet passes a law. I use the number of secondary mills
in the state, and voters’ preference for environmental policies as variables that affect the decision.
31I run regressions of the recycling rate on the opportunity cost and endogenous measures such as total demand for
these inputs in table 2.5 in the Appendix. I find that the opportunity cost is a significant and positive predictor of the
recycling rate but the endogenous measures have no significant effect across specifications.
32The specific products included in this indicator are Corrugating Medium, Newsprint and Linerboard.
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Table 1.3: Enactment of Subsidy Laws and Environmental Concerns
(1) (2)
LCV House Score 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.005)
# Secondary Mills -0.005
(0.021)
Observations 853 853
Number of Failures 121 121
Log Likelihood -574.45 -574.42
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Results for regressions of survival analysis where failure is the passage of the subsidy law.
I report the results in Table 1.3. In column (1) I only include the League of Conservation Voters
(LCV) score as a proxy for environmental friendliness. In column (2), I add the endogenous num-
ber of mills. As seen in both columns, states whose voters are more environmentally friendly are
more likely to enact a subsidy law at the state level. These voter preferences for more environmen-
tal regulation appear an important factor leading to the laws passage, and crucially these scores are
not determined by voters’ preferences for regulation of the paper industry specifically. In contrast,
the number of secondary paper mills in the state does not appear to explain the passage of the laws.
Intuitively if lobbying by paper firms explains whether a subsidy is enacted, then there should be
a significant relationship between these variables. Given the results of these specifications, I take
the passage of these laws as exogenous in the empirical specification.
The last empirical challenge involves identifying forward-looking behavior. I use variation
in the contemporaneous recycling rate as a variable that only impact firms’ future values. An
increase in the recycling rate increases the stock of future recycled input but leaves the current
stock unchanged. From the first order condition of the myopic problem, equation (M), firms do
not respond to variation in the future value term. The recycling rate enters the dynamic problem
through the effect on the future value, and an increase in the recycling rate lowers the future value
of primary firms. These firms recognize that a higher recycling rate leads to a greater future stock,
and hence more intense competition from secondary firms. Primary firm that can influence the
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future stock should respond by decreasing current quantity to soften future competition. This
timing assumption matches the facts of the paper industry reported in Coet, Poganietz, and Schebek
(2014). These authors find that the average time between when paper is sold to the first consumer,
and when secondary paper manufactured from the original paper is resold is at least one year.
1.4.3 Primary Quantity Response
Table 1.4: Primary Firm Quantity Supplied and Secondary Competition
(1) (2) (3)
Subsidy -1.97*** -1.36*** -1.44***
(0.65) (0.53) (0.41)
Regional GDP 3.59*** 2.26*** 1.53***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13)
Electricity Price -1.11*** -0.75*** -0.32***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.033)
Stock -0.11*** -0.063*** -0.085***
(0.006) (0.017) (0.018)
Recycling Rate -0.18 0.042 0.083
(0.11) (0.093) (0.073)
Sec CompXRecycling Rate -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.27***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.084)
Observations 6,126 6,126 6,126
R-squared 0.284 0.459 0.420
Year FE YES YES YES
Prod FE NO YES YES
Owner FE NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Note: Results for regressions of primary owner supply on covariates. All results are for fixed effect regressions with
the coefficients on fixed effects omitted for brevity. Secondary competition indicator created using end sample share
of secondary firm for each product.
I report the results of the primary quantity supplied regression, equation 1.6, in Table 1.4. Col-
umn (1) includes the key variables hypothesized to influence firm behavior, all observable controls
and year fixed effects. Column (2) adds product fixed effects, and column (3) is the panel regres-
sion at the firm level. Examining these columns studies the implication of controlling for different
sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, I successively control for aggregate demand
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shocks that impact all firms’ quantity supplied decision, product-level unobserved consumer pref-
erences for primary over secondary products, and firm specific unobservables that influence supply
decisions.
The coefficients appear stable retaining their sign and significance across these different spec-
ifications, so I focus the discussion on the results in column (3). The coefficient on the subsidy is
negative and significant. This result suggests that primary firms in a state with a secondary subsidy
supply a lower quantity than comparable firms in a state without a subsidy. This result is consistent
with the predictions of the model because primary firms reduce supply in response to more intense
competition from the secondary firms.
I also find that a 10% increase in the stock of recycled input leads to a 0.9% reduction in
a primary firm’s quantity supplied, and that this result is statistically significant.33 This result
provides further evidence that an increase in the competition from the secondary firms leads to a
reduction in primary production. In particular, this response is evidence that primary firms reduce
supply as the contemporaneous cost of secondary firms decreases, consistent with the predictions
of proposition 3.1.
My estimated coefficient on the recycling rate for a firm not exposed to competition is 0.083
and is not statistically significant. In comparison, the coefficient for recycling rate for a firm ex-
posed to secondary competition is -0.27 and statistically significant. This result provides evidence
that primary firms are forward-looking and strategic. In particular, firms differ in their response to
the recycling rate based on whether the firm has the ability to influence future competition from
the secondary firms. The differential response to recycling based on exposure to secondary com-
petition holds across specifications.
To put the estimated effects in perspective, I provide a back of the envelope calculation of the
change in profit. The average primary firm produces approximately 430 tons of paper per day. The
coefficient on the interaction between secondary competition and the recycling rate in column (1)
33I also calculate supply elasticities with respect to the recycled stock in my calibrated simulation exercises to
compare to these regression results. My regression estimates are of the same sign and similar magnitude to those
calculated in the exercises.
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implies this firm will decrease its quantity by 12 tons per day in response to a 10% increase in
the recycling rate. Assuming that price does not adjust to this change, I calculate a measure of the
revenue forgone by multiply this change in quantity by the price of the median paper product during
this period.34 This exercise implies that this firm forgoes a median of $6,900 from the forward-
looking response to an increase in the recycling rate. Scaling up to annual level, this result implies
a median of $2.4 million of revenue forgone. During the year used for this calculation, each of the
20 largest firms had revenue greater than $1 billion, so the predicted reduction is approximately
2.4% of this amount.
1.4.4 Primary Best Response
I report the results of the primary best response regression specifications in Table 1.5. Column
(1) includes the total quantity supplied by the secondary firms as a direct test of the change in cur-
rent competition. Column (2) adds the recycling rate to test the response to the dynamic incentive.
If primary firms’ best response is consistent with the theoretical model, then the inclusion of the
recycling rate should influence primary behavior. In column (3), I add product fixed effects, and
in column (4) I add firm fixed effects to control for other sources of unobservables as discussed in
the regressions on the primary firms’ quantity supplied.
The coefficient on the quantity supplied by secondary firms is -0.06 and statistically significant
in column (1). This coefficient implies that a 10% increase in secondary supply lowers a primary
firms quantity by 0.6%. Thus, the best response function for the primary firm is relatively flat. This
result is consistent with a primary firm reducing quantity in response to more intense competition
from the secondary firms. The coefficient is of similar sign and significance across the specifica-
tions. Relative to the results presented in table 1.4 the results of the best response regressions show
the direct response to competition instead of the indirect effect from the policy change.
The first column does not include the recycling rate directly in the regression; however, be-
cause the current recycling rate affects how the future value of a primary firm changes equation
34Ince (1993) reports list prices on each product in 1986. I use these prices because the only available time series
of prices are price indices that cannot be used to quantify the magnitude of these effects.
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Table 1.5: Primary Firm Best Response and Secondary Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Secondary Supply -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.041***
(0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0047)
Sec Comp 1.92*** 2.30*** 1.65***
(0.33) (0.30) (0.23)
Recycling Rate 0.068 0.14 0.22***
(0.11) (0.090) (0.069)
Sec CompXRecycling Rate -0.58*** -0.61*** -0.46***
(0.096) (0.086) (0.065)
Regional GDP 3.16*** 3.06*** 1.74*** 0.96***
(0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11)
Electricity Price -1.06*** -1.08*** -0.66*** -0.24***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032)
Observations 6,126 6,126 6,126 6,126
R-squared 0.252 0.257 0.462 0.42
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Prod FE NO NO YES YES
Owner FE NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Results for regressions of primary owner supply on covariates. The coefficients on fixed effects omitted for
brevity.
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1.5 implies the current recycling rate should directly enter these specifications. Similar to the pre-
vious empirical specifications, only forward looking firms account for this term, so I include the
interact between this rate and the indicator for exposure to secondary competition in columns (2)-
(4). Similar to the equilibrium quantity regression specifications, I find that the coefficient on the
interaction between secondary competition and the recycling rate is negative and significant across
specification. In comparison, the coefficient on recycling is positive and not significant in most
specifications. These results provide further evidence that firms are forward-looking. The increase
in recycling rate leads to a shift inward of the best response function for firms that can affect future
competition relative to the best response functions of similar firms that cannot directly influence
future competition.
1.5 Simulation of Policy Exercises
1.5.1 Simulation Motivation and Setup
To explore the policy implications of my model in more detail, I turn to simulations exercises
of the theoretical model. I take parameters values from a range of sources. In Table A.9 in the
Appendix, I list the parameter values and their sources. These exercises let me study firm response
and equilibrium outcomes of policy interventions in a dynamic oligopoly with recycling.
Recall that the theoretical model specifies the problem of a firm i as
Vi(Q̄t−1) = max
qit
πit(qit, q−it; Q̄t−1) + βVi(Q̄t)
where imposing β = 0 yields the myopic model. For each exercise, I solve the model, collect
equilibrium objects, and construct other policy relevant statistics along the equilibrium path of
play. To make the results comparable to previous works, I focus on the case of linear demand,
constant marginal costs and a recycled input supply function derived from Swan (1980). For the
dynamic model I assume that firms use a common discount rate β = 0.95.
I compare two models throughout these exercises and take the perspective that the outcomes
represent what a policy maker would predict if it had access to the same information. The first
model assumes that the policy maker accounts for the dynamics, so understands that firms solve
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(D). The second model instead assumes that the policy maker assumes that firms do not account for
the dynamic impact of recycling and instead are solving a repeated version of problem (M). Thus,
the results of these exercises allow a comparison of the predictions that would arise from policy
simulations that do and do not account for this form of dynamics. For example, the exercises
illustrate two different methods of running merger simulations for this industry.
The first set of exercises studies the implication of the competition softening incentives on
inference about market power. For these exercises, I calculate each firm’s markup and the HHI,
two measures commonly used to infer market power for static, homogeneous goods oligopolies.
I compare these measures from the dynamic and myopic model over a range of market struc-
tures. These exercises illustrate the potential bias from using standard antitrust analysis when the
dynamic incentives are an important feature of competition.
I next simulate horizontal mergers to explore the incentives for and equilibrium effects of merg-
ers in the model. These exercises study changes in quantity supplied by the merging firms and
consumer surplus. I consider the merger model of Salant et al. (1983) that isolates the merger
effects from any efficiency gains. In the Appendix, I consider alternative merger models such as
Perry and Porter (1985) that let mergers affect marginal costs.
The final set of exercises studies the interaction between firms’ strategic behavior and policies
designed to shift towards more environmentally friendly producers. Recall from section 1.3 the
social planner designs policy to both limit the harms from environmental damages and exercise of
market power. I first study the observed policy of subsidizing the production of the relatively clean
secondary firm. Then I study three alternative policies: i) a pigouian tax on the primary firms, ii)
an increase in the recycling rate, and iii) a decrease in the depreciation rate of the stock of recycled
input.35 The first two exercises are different market based methods to influence firm behavior. The
last two exercises illustrate attempts to exploit the dynamics of the problem to change behavior. For
each of these experiments I calculate the change in primary supply, and hence the environmental
35This last policy can help illustrate the effect of the import ban on recycled material by China. After this ban, the
stock of recycled paper increased significantly suggesting one way to think about the depreciation rate is as a proxy
for exporting the good. For a discussion of this policy see https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-recycling-companies-face-
upheaval-from-china-scrap-ban-1533231057. Accessed 10/12/2018.
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harm from production, and consumer surplus net of harms.
1.5.2 Results and Discussion of Simulations
Market Power. I first discuss the results of the simulations on inference about market power
by comparing markups and concentration in the dynamic and myopic model over different market
structures. I then discuss how the dynamic incentives explains the difference in these measures
and provide a potential explanation for the wave of mergers observed in the paper industry during
the 1980s. For each exercise, I analyze the incentives faced by the firms in the steady state of the
model. I discuss the compute method for these simulations in the Appendix.
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Figure 1.5: Difference in % primary markups between dynamic and myopic models, holding fixed
the number of secondary firms at 1 and varying the number of primary firms.
I illustrate the percentage difference in a primary firm’s markup over market structures in Fig-
ure 1.5. Across all market structure, primary firms charge higher markups in the dynamic model
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relative to the myopic model. The intuition for this result is that primary firms reduce contempora-
neous supply to soften the future competition from the secondary firms. Thus, each primary firm’s
supply is less in the dynamic model relative to the myopic model yielding the greater markup.
In simulations of a market that includes one primary and one secondary firm, the primary firm’s
markup is approximately 12% higher in the dynamic model. Thus, a policy maker that does not
account for dynamics will underestimate the exercise of market power and be relatively too per-
missive towards mergers between primary firms. As the number of primary firms increases, the
competition softening incentive decreases, and the myopic strategic incentives become relatively
more important. This result illustrates the dynamic externality as each firm’s markup and quan-
tity supplied in the dynamic model become more similar to these same outcomes in the myopic
models. Internalizing the dynamic incentive provides these firms a further incentive to merge in
the dynamic model. Combining the underestimate of market power by antitrust authorities and
the greater incentive to merge by primary firms provides a theoretical explanation for the mergers
observed during my period.
Measures of market concentration such as the HHI are lower in the dynamic model than in the
myopic model. The intuition for this result is that the reduction in supply caused by the competition
softening incentive both reduces primary market share and increases secondary market share. In
the simulation of a market with one firm of each type, the HHI is approximately 6% lower in the
dynamic model relative to the myopic model. I illustrate this result in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
Horizontal Mergers. The second set of exercises investigates how the competition softening
incentive interacts with horizontal mergers. I study the case with 2 primary firms and 1 secondary
firm pre-merger, and I simulate a merger between the primary firms. I examine the outcomes of
the model pre-merger, the short run effect that occurs the period of the merger, and the long run
effects in steady state post-merger. For both models, I normalize the pre-merger values to 100, so
that I can isolate the changes caused from the merger from any pre-merger differences between the
models.
In the dynamic model, primary firms decrease their combined quantity by approximately 35%
immediately after the merger while in the myopic model these firms decrease their quantity by
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28%. Therefore, there is a greater reduction in the dynamic model. In both models the primary
firm internalizes how a quantity reduction raises their current joint profit. In the dynamic model
the firms also internalize the competition softening effect of a quantity reduction on future profits
resulting in the greater reduction in this model.
Combined with the results of the market power exercises, these merger exercises show that
antitrust authorities that do not account for the dynamic incentives may miss a further source of
anti-competitive behavior caused by horizontal mergers. The greater anti-competitive effects in
the long run occur because the quantity reduction effectively softens future competition from the
secondary firms, and the primary firms are able to expand their quantity supplied in the long run
when they face higher cost rivals. I illustrate primary supply in these merger exercises in Figure
1.6.

















Figure 1.6: Primary quantity before and after merger. Pre-Merger structure 2 primary and 1 sec-
ondary firms.
The secondary firm directly responds to the merger by expanding quantity in the short run.
In the myopic model the secondary firm increases its quantity by 9% in the short run, and the
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response is similar in the dynamic model. However, in the long run, the secondary firm’s quantity
decreases relative to the pre-merger case. This reduction occurs because the quantity reduction by
the primary firms lowers the stock of the input and successfully softens competition in the long
run. Because the primary firms reduce quantity more in the dynamic model, the reduction in long
term secondary quantity is greater in the dynamic model. This reduction is approximately 22%
relative to pre-merger in the dynamic model and 15% in the myopic model.
Finally, I illustrate the change in consumer surplus to show that mergers are worse for con-
sumers in the dynamic model in Figure 1.7. Consumer surplus decreases by approximately 45%
in the dynamic model and 36% in the myopic model in the short run. The primary firms’ supply
reduction both directly raises the price and raises the secondary firm’s future cost resulting in a fur-
ther increase in the price. These increases result in consumer surplus falling by approximately 50%
in the dynamic model and 41% in the myopic model. Thus, the harm to consumers is greater in the
long run because of the dynamic competition softening strategies. In Figure A.2 in the Appendix,
I show the change in the total quantity supplied in each model.



















Figure 1.7: Consumer surplus before and after merger. Pre-Merger structure 2 primary and 1
secondary firms.
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Before turning to the environmental policy exercise, I caution that the results for consumer
harm depend on the assumption that market structure is fixed after the merger occurs. While there
was not significant entry in the paper industry, it is worth commenting on how such behavior
could change the merger results. The increased profit opportunities for primary firms may induce
entry post-merger and reduce the quantity reduction in the long run. While not the purpose of this
paper, the wave of mergers observed in the paper industry also suggest that future work that study
these styles of dynamic incentives should consider whether the dynamics change the pattern of
endogenous mergers as in Nocke and Whinston (2013).
Policy. The last set of exercises investigates how dynamic, strategic incentives interact with
policies aimed at shifting production away from primary firms. Consistent with the theoretical
planner’s problem, I consider only harms from primary production to focus on the trade-off be-
tween eliminating sources of harm. I illustrate the time series of both primary quantity, which
shows the harms from primary production, and the total quantity supplied. Similar to the merger
exercises, I show these results before the planner implements the policy, the short run effect and
the long run outcome. In each exercise, I focus on the case of a single primary and secondary firm
and compare outcomes in the dynamic and myopic models. All quantities are normalized to 100
before the policy implementation.
I first discuss a subsidy for the secondary firm.36 I illustrate the results of this exercise in
Figure 1.8. The subsidy works by raising the marginal revenue of secondary firms and only affects
primary behavior through strategic interaction. The effectiveness of the subsidy is limited because
the primary firm’s strategic supply response. The short term reduction raises the future cost of the
secondary firm and partially offsets the benefit of the subsidy. The short run and long run reduction
in primary quantity are of similar magnitude. The reduction is approximately 6% in the dynamic
model and 4% in the myopic model. Intuitively, the primary firm realizes that competition will
be more intense in the future because of the subsidy. Therefore, the primary firm react by further
reducing quantity relative to the response in the dynamic model without a subsidy. While the
36I consider a 50% price premium rather than the 5% premium observed in the data. Increasing the magnitude of
the subsidy makes the subsidy comparable to the other exercises.
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Figure 1.8: Primary quantity before and after subsidy for secondary firm.
magnitude of the reduction in primary supply, and hence environmental harms, appears low relative
to the level of the subsidy, these results suggest that policies exploiting the dynamic strategies can
be more effective in reducing environmental damages than implementing the same policy in a
myopic model.
The next exercise studies a $5 per-unit tax on primary production to illustrate the interaction
between incentives and a standard policy response to environmental damages. This policy changes
behavior by directly raising the primary firm’s marginal cost. The primary quantity reduction is
similar in the dynamic and myopic model with a reduction of approximately 8% in the short run and
7% in the long run. The response is similar in the two models because the policy does not affect the
dynamic incentives. Therefore, the incentive to further reduce quantity to soften future competition
is relatively less important than the direct incentives to change quantity supplied created by the tax.
I illustrate the change in the primary firms quantity supplied in Figure A.3 in the Appendix.
I also study a doubling of the recycling rate. This exercise illustrates an attempt to change
behavior by exploiting the dynamics of the problem, and imposes the long run change in the US
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Figure 1.9: Primary quantity before and after an increase in recycling rate.
paper recycling rate in a single period. Increasing the recycling rate raises the stock of the recycled
input for any given quantity supplied in the current period, and hence lowers the future cost of
the secondary firm. I illustrate the primary firm’s quantity response to this policy in Figure 1.9.
The short run quantity reduction by the primary firm is approximately 19% in the dynamic model
and exactly 0% in the myopic model. The primary firm must reduce supply by a greater amount to
soften future competition for a higher recycling rate in the dynamic model. The primary firm in the
myopic model does not account for the effect of current supply on future competition so does not
respond in the period in which the recycling rate changes. The recycling policy is more effective
than the subsidy because it targets the constraint on the secondary firm created by the stock of the
recycled input. Therefore, the threat of future competition becomes more intense, so primary firms
must reduce supply by a greater amount to achieve a given level of competition softening.
I also illustrate the change in total quantity supplied after the recycling rate experiment in
Figure 1.10. The total quantity supplied increases by about 5% in the long run in the myopic
model. In comparison, the total quantity decreases by about 16% in the dynamic model. The
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Figure 1.10: Total quantity before and after an increase in recycling rate.
difference in total quantity illustrates that the strategic primary behavior can exacerbate the exercise
of market power after the recycling rate increases.37 The reduction in quantity also highlights trade-
off between eliminating the harms from the exercise of market power and production harms in the
dynamic model.
The final exercise studies a 10% decrease in the depreciation rate, so that the contribution
of supply in one period affects competition over a longer time. The supply of the primary firm
decrease in both cases although similar to the subsidy exercise the effect is relatively small. This
policy exploits the dynamics resulting in a greater reduction in the dynamic model. Similar to
the recycling rate, the primary firm needs to reduce quantity by a greater amount to soften future
competition because contemporaneous supply contributes to the stock of the input for a greater
number of periods. However, the difference between the models is small with a long run decrease
of 2.3% in the dynamic and 1.6% in the myopic model. Figure A.4 in the Appendix, shows the
37A related interesting point is that a merger between primary firms generates a similar trade-off between environ-
mental harms and total supply. This creates a new link between environmental and antitrust policy.
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change in primary quantity from this exercise.
Viewing these environmental policies in total provides two lessons for policy makers. First,
policies that are more successful at eliminating market power perform poorly in reducing the en-
vironmental harms from production. Second, policies have different levels of impact on outcomes
depending on whether firms respond to the dynamics or not. Thus, the challenge of designing
optimal policy is that the policy makers must have information on both the relative harms from the
two sources and whether firms respond to the dynamics or not. Similar to the discussion of the
merger exercises, these results do not account for other dynamic behavior such as entry that impact
these outcomes.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a theoretical model of oligopoly competition in which the good is
recycled creating an intermediate input that rival firms sell in the future. This model illustrates that
firms face a dynamic incentive to reduce current quantity supplied and soften future competition
from the firms using the recycled input. I empirically test the predictions of the model using data
on firm behavior in the US paper industry and find that primary firms reduce their quantity supplied
in response to more intense secondary competition in the current and future period.
Simulations of the model illustrate several novel implications of the model. The first implica-
tion concerns the dynamic externality between primary firms. When an individual primary firm
reduces its supply in one period, it bears the full cost of forgone profits, but the future benefits of
softer competition is shared among all primary firms. I show internalizing this effect generates a
new incentive for primary firms to horizontally merger, and the internalization leads to a greater
increase in price post-merger and further harms to consumers. At the same time, antitrust authori-
ties that do not account for the dynamic incentive will underestimate the exercise of market power
pre-merger. Thus, the agency will be too likely to allow mergers than if the policy maker accounts
for the dynamics. Combining these two results shows that using concentration based measures
such as specified in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) will lead antitrust authorities to in-
correctly infer that markets are more competitive. Accounting for how dynamic incentives, such as
those identified in this setting, interact with firm incentives to merge is an important area for future
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work on the design of merger policies. Similar dynamic incentives are important in other setting,
in particular markets in which some firms resale used versions of a good such as the automobile
and apparel industries.
The environmental policy simulations illustrate the difficulty of designing policy with strategic,
forward-looking agents. The impact of policies on outcomes depend on how policy makers target
behavior and the strategic response to these interventions. In this setting, policies that are more
effective at reducing environmental damages have the cost of greater exercise of market power. A
future line of research suggested by this result is how to design policy to shift production when
firms can take strategic action to counteract the policy. Similar incentives to those studied in this
paper exist in other dynamic oligopoly settings and in single agent problems when consumers can
behave strategically, such as timing the purchase of a durable good with a time varying subsidy as
in Langer and Lemoine (2018). Understanding the incentives in settings similar to the one analyzed
in my work can help illustrate on incentives in related settings and help policy makers design more
effective policies.
Several important limitations exist to this work that future researchers can explore. First, entry
and exit of firms are an important feature of oligopolies that I do not consider in this work. A more
general model in the style of Ericson and Pakes (1995) that endogenizes market structure while
preserving the competition softening incentive is a valuable line for future research.
Second, I explore the implications of exogenous mergers in this paper. A more general model
that incorporates endogenous mergers and antitrust evaluations of mergers is an important step for
future researchers. Endogenizing these behaviors will provide a richer explanation of the pattern
of consolidation observed in the US paper industry and industries with similar incentives.
Finally, my model applies narrowly to a subset of models with dynamic competition softening
incentives. A more general model is needed to extend the work for use in analysis of other market
settings. Of particular interest is how models with different types of competition in the current
period, and different links between current strategy and future payoffs differ. Developing general
lessons for how dynamic incentives interact with merger incentives, as in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984), seems a promising line for future work on merger policy.
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CHAPTER 2
PRICE LEADERSHIP AND THE LIMIT OF ASYMMETRIC COURNOT COMPETITION
2.1 Introduction
Empirical researchers often specify intermediate levels of competition between monopoly and
perfect competition by considering markets in which a dominant firm sets price, and a competitive
fringe serves the remainder of the market at that price. These models were originally developed to
study firm behavior before the widespread use of game theory in antitrust analysis. More recent
research has modified the dominant firm model to study economic settings in which a single firm
influences market price. For example, the model has been used to analyze the extraction and sale of
petroleum by the OPEC Cartel, to analyze Alcoa’s incentive to supply a recyclable good, and has
been extended to more general forms of dynamic competition.1,2,3 In each of these analyses, the
researcher impose supply side assumptions on timing and cost advantage for the dominant firm.
Antitrust policy takes a skeptical view of behavior by firms with a significantly large market
share. While the explicit policies differ across countries, actions by such dominant firms are pre-
sumed to be more likely to limit or foreclose competition than firms with lower market shares.4
Horizontal merger policy in many countries also contains rules that in many cases attempt to pre-
vent mergers that would lead to the merged firms controlling too high a share of the market. Thus,
acquiring a large market share could be blocked even without explicit abusive behavior.
1Salant (1976) provides a formal model of OPEC’s behavior that has been used and extended in many works. See
Al-Qahanti, Balisteri, and Dahl (2008) for a recent survey of works on this setting.
2Swan (1980) provides a discussion of the intertemporal problem of a dominant firm facing a fringe that produce
by recycling the product.
3Ifrach and Weintraub (2017) analyze oligopoly models that allow firms’ strategies to depend on their own state
variables, the state of the dominant firm, and moments of the fringe firms’ states.
4For example, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) explicitly prohibit “Any
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market.”
In this paper, I explore the relationship between equilibrium price, quantity and market struc-
ture in the dominant firm model and a game-theoretic formalization of imperfect competition with
cost asymmetries. These are commonly used measures in antitrust analysis. The comparison be-
tween models lets me study the importance of timing and supply side assumptions for the study of
imperfectly competitive markets with cost asymmetries.
My oligopoly model captures a cost advantage that results in a dominant position for one
of the firms in equilibrium. The firms with the cost disadvantage, which I call followers, have
a cost component that increases in the aggregate supply by these firms. As an example of this
cost specification, I specify this portion of the cost arises because these firms purchase a finitely
available intermediate input. The price of this input increases as the followers use more of the input
in aggregate. This assumption on costs ensures as the number of followers tends to infinity, each
of follower’s individual quantity supplied becomes small in a manner that approximates the price-
taking behavior of firms in perfect competition. Therefore, the limit of my asymmetric Cournot
model provides a meaningful comparison to the dominant firm model without imposing the timing
and price-taking assumptions of the dominant firm model.
Holding fixed the demand and cost functions, I show the equilibrium price is higher and the
leader’s market share higher in the dominant firm model. This result occurs because the leaders
behavior is less constrained when facing price-taking instead of strategic followers. I also consider
an extension that lets multiple firms act as leaders. In markets with multiple leaders, the dominant
firm model also leads to greater equilibrium prices. The comparison between the aggregate market
share of the leaders depends on parameters of the model.
Finally, I endogenize market structure by considering a free-entry equilibrium. In the first stage,
followers can pay a sunk cost to acquire the technology to become a leader. After entry, the second
stage is either the dominant firm model or the Cournot model as discussed above.5 For a fixed
number of leaders, profits are higher in the dominant firm model. Hence, the incentives to enter are
greater in this model. These results on the number of leaders provides a micro-foundation for the
5To maintain comparability, I assume there are an infinite number of followers in the first stage of the game.
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intuitive relationship between pricing power and barriers to entry discussed in the literature using
the dominant firm model. Because these barriers could be created by anti-competitive behavior,
the model provides further rationalization for antitrust policy towards dominant firms. I use the
results of these free-entry models to discuss historical cases examined as dominant firms.
My modeling exercise builds on Tasnadi (2010). He demonstrates the dominant firm model
arises as the limit of a Stackelberg quantity-setting model with a single leader and the number of
strategic followers going to infinity. However, if the timing of actions is not exogeously deter-
mined, then the Stackelberg model in his model cannot arise.6 I build on this work by removing
the timing assumptions and endogenizing market structure that still yields predictions similar to
the commonly used model in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model and provides the
main result. Section 2.3 extends the results to a case with many dominant firms and provides a
discussion. I endogenize market structure and compare the models in section 2.4. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Model Set-Up
I assume that N + 1 firms sell a homogeneous good. There is an exogenously given firm
that I term the leader and denote this firm by i = 0, and N ≥ 1 firms that I term the followers.
The leader has production cost C0(q0), and each follower, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, has production cost
Ci(qi) = C̃i(qi) + R(
∑N
n=1 qn)qi. The followers’ costs are composed of a portion using inputs
such as labor, C̃i, and a cost of using an intermediate input, R(·)q. I assume the price of the
input increases in the total quantity demanded by these firms, R′ ≥ 0. The leader and followers
simultaneously set quantities.
I make the following assumptions on primitives of the model.
Assumption 2.2.1 The demand and cost functions satisfy the following: i) P : R+ → R+ is
continuous, ii) there existsZ∗ <∞ such that P (Z∗) = 0, and P is twice continuously differentiable
and strictly decreasing on [0, Z∗), iii) for all Z ∈ [0, Z∗), P ′(Z) + ZP ′′(Z) ≤ 0, and iv) for all
6This result builds on Matsumura (1999) that shows at most 1 firm would choose the follower role with endogenous
timing of actions.
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i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, Ci : R+ → R+ is a nondecreasing, lower semi-continuous function.
These assumptions satisfy the conditions of Novshek (1985) that ensure the Cournot equilibrium
exists for each fixed number of firms. While these assumptions are standard, checking the assump-
tions on costs requires this condition holds for each part of the followers’ costs. However, iv) will
hold if the individual parts of cost each satisfy the conditions, so I impose these conditions in the
illustration.
The first order conditions for a fixed number of firms in the Cournot model are
P ′(qi +Q−i)qi + P (qi +Q−i)− C ′i(qi) = 0 , ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , N} (2.1)
where Q−i is the aggregate supply of all firms other than i. Consistent with the Nash conjecture,
each firm behaves strategically but assumes the other firms will not respond to a deviation in
quantity supplied.
In comparison, the dominant firm model assumes a stage game with leaders acting first and
then followers setting quantity such that price equals these firms marginal cost. Thus, the leader
anticipates the response of the followers when setting quantity in the first stage. Denoting qf (q0)
the best response of the followers in the second stage of the game to any leader quantity, a major
difference between the models is that the leader assumes the followers respond to a change in
strategy in contrast to Cournot model.7 Firm behavior satisfies the following conditions in the
dominant firm model with the first equation the optimal decision for the followers in the second
stage. The second equation gives the first order condition for the leader
C ′f (qf (q0)) = P (q0 + qf (q0)) (2.2)
P ′(q0 + qf (q0))q0(1 + q
′
f (q0)) + P (q0 + qf (q0))− C ′0(q0) = 0. (2.3)
7In the Stackelberg quantity-setting model, the leader also anticipates response by the followers; however, the
leader assumes the followers respond strategically.
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2.2.1 Illustration of Result
I illustrate and quantify the difference between these models using a linear (inverse) demand
curve P (Q) = a − bQ. To simplify exposition, I normalize the leader’s cost to C0(q0) = 0. Each
follower has costs Ci(qi) = φ(
∑N
n=1 qn)qi with φ ≥ 0. I solve for an equilibrium in which all the
followers use symmetric strategies.
















Solving the model gives equilibrium objects for a fixed number of followers N as
qC0 =
a(b+ (N + 1)φ)
b(b(N + 2) + 2(N + 1)φ)
qCi =
a
b(N + 2) + 2(N + 1)φ
PC =
a(b+ (N + 1)φ)
b(N + 2) + 2(N + 1)φ
.
The C superscript denotes these equilibrium objects arise from the Cournot model.

























The intuition for the individual and aggregate supply of the followers comes from the relationship
between the followers’ aggregate quantity supplied and an individual follower’s marginal cost.
Holding fixed the supply of each follower but adding another follower increases the cost of each
follower. Thus, each follower has an incentive to reduce its quantity supplied a little to lower
marginal cost and increase its profit. The limit of this process leads to each firm having quantity
supplied of zero in equilibrium.
The limit of the Cournot model captures several important features of the dominant firm model.
That is, the leader faces a downward sloping demand curve, each follower’s quantity supplied has
no individual impact on the equilibrium outcome, and the equilibrium price lies strictly between
monopoly and perfect competition. Thus, the leader earns profit because the equilibrium price
is greater than its marginal cost, but the competition from the followers prevents the price from
reaching the level that an unconstrained monopolist would choose.
In the dominant firm model, the leader anticipates the second stage behavior by the followers
and maximizes profit using the residual demand curve accounting for the response. Solving for
the leader’s equilibrium quantity supplied, and then using this value to find the followers’ behavior













Here the f superscript denotes these objects are those from the dominant firm model. The leader
has the ability to set price above marginal cost. However, as the leader choses a higher price, the
followers have an incentive to supply more at this higher price. This response limits the pricing
power of the leader in the dominant firm model
I first compare two equilibrium objects of interest that antitrust authorities to illustrate the
implication of supply side assumptions. First the followers’ quantity supplied matters because the
market share of these firms have been used to evaluate whether a firm has established a dominant
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position.8 I also compare the equilibrium prices because this measure gives a direct measure of
harm to consumers.
Proposition 2.2.1 With a single leader, the following comparisons hold between the limit of the
Cournot model and the dominant firm model. The followers’ quantity supplied is higher and the
equilibrium price is lower in the Cournot model.






qCn )− qfn = 2b+ 4φ ≥ 0
lim
N→∞
(PC)− P f = −2b2 − 4bφ ≤ 0.
To understand the difference between these models, recall that the dominant firm model assumes
the leader sets it quantity first. This timing endows the leader with a degree of commitment not
available in the Cournot model. The intuition is similar to that of the comparison between Stackel-
berg and Cournot quantity-setting models. The firm that acts first can profitably expand production
beyond the level it would chose in the simultaneous move game anticipating an accommodating
reduction in response by the followers. However, the first mover advantage and smallness of fol-
lowers is not enough.9 The extra advantage provided by facing price-taking rivals is what provides
another advantage to the leader, and results in the greater price. An alternative way to see this
result is to consider the best response function of the followers in the two models. The response
function of the followers is steeper in the dominant firm model, so the leader can induce a greater
reduction by the followers. This response leads to the higher equilibrium price.
2.3 Markets with Many Leaders
I next consider an extension that lets multiple firms act as leaders. While the focus on the
case with a single firm helps understand the implications of the supply side assumptions in the
8Article 102 of the TFEU has been interpreted a market share of greater than 50% as a strong evidence of domi-
nance.
9In the Appendix, I show that price in the limit of a Stackelberg game with the same functional forms leads to a
lower price than the Cournot model consistent with the previous comparisons between the quantity-setting models.
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previous literature, industrial consolidation has made markets with a few firms jointly controlling
a dominant position in a market more common.10 To address these case, one requires a method to
analyze behavior under different market structures.
To study this extension, I consider a game with M ≥ 2 leaders and maintain all the previous
conditions on demand and cost functions. I index the leaders by i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and the followers
by j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Solving the Cournot model, for a fixed number of leaders M , and then taking




















b+ (M + 1)φ
.
The key results from the single leader case are preserved with multiple leaders. That is, each
leader faces a downward sloping demand curve, each follower has zero impact on equilibrium
outcomes, and the equilibrium price lies between the perfectly competitive price of zero and the
price in an oligopoly model without the followers. Further, the aggregate quantity supplied by
the leaders is greater than if these firms formed a cartel and monopolized the market. Consistent
with previous work on the relationship between the Cournot model and perfect competition, as
the number of leaders also goes to infinity the ability to raise price is decreased and the result is
marginal cost pricing. The equilibrium price declines as the number of leaders increases. There
are two competing quantity supplied effects underlying the change in price. First, an aggregate
expansion by the leaders occurs because of the inability of these firms to coordinate on the cartel
outcome. Second, there is a strategic reduction in aggregate follower quantity supplied as an
10The antitrust authorities also consider cases of joint-dominance with the interpretation of market share in the
TFEU also extending to cases with several firms producing the majority of production.
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equilibrium response to the leaders behavior. The first effect turns out to be greater and leads to a
decline in equilibrium price.
The equilibrium objects in the dominant firm model with M leader firms are
qfn =
a(b(M + 1) + 2φ)
(M + 1)(b+ 2φ)2
qf0 =
2aφ
b(M + 1)(b+ 2φ)
P f =
2aφ(b(M + 1) + 2φ)
(M + 1)(b+ 2φ)2
Similar to the Cournot case, the greater competition between the primary firms expands aggregate
quantity supplied and leads to a reduction in equilibrium price. The total aggregate supply of the
followers also decreases in this model because the increase in the supply by the leaders leads to a
reduction in price. The lower equilibrium price lowers the incentives for the followers to supply.
Proposition 2.3.1 The followers quantity is higher in the limit of the Cournot model than in the




. The price is always higher in the fringe model.
Proof 2.3.1 Rearranging the expression for the difference between the followers’ quantity supplied
gives the first comparison. Rearranging the difference in prices gives
lim
N→∞
(PC)− P f = −b2(M + 1)− 2bφ(M2 + 1) < 0.
Similar to the single leader case, the price is higher in the dominant firm model because price-
taking leads to greater accommodation by the followers. For any given quantity supplied by the
leaders, the reduction by the followers leads to a higher price. The intuition for the difference
in follower quantity comes from the best response of the leaders. In the dominant firm model,
the leaders respond to changes in both the demand intercept and the followers’ cost directly. An
increase in this cost leads to a direct expansion of quantity by each leader. In comparison, the
leaders only respond to an increase in the cost through the strategic interaction in the Cournot
model.
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2.4 Endogenous Market Structure
2.4.1 Free Entry
For homogeneous product markets, firm profits and equilibrium price decrease as the number
of firms increase. These results provide evidence that entry is beneficial to consumers by leading
to lower prices. I study whether these results extend to the asymmetric costs models considered
in this paper. To determine whether free-entry leads to different market structures between these
models, I assume that all firms can access the technology to operate as a follower at zero cost. In
contrast, a firm must pay a fixed cost, F > 0, to acquire the leader’s production technology.
Denote the profit of an individual leader, when there are M leaders in the market, as πk(M)
for k ∈ {C, f}, for the Cournot and dominant firm models respectively. The value of these objects
come from the quantity supplied and prices derived in the section 2.3. The timing of the game is
first all firms simultaneously decide whether to become a leader. In the second stage, the firms set
quantity either in the Cournot model or dominant firm model analyzed in section 2.3. Restricting
attention to pure strategies at the entry stage, the subgame perfect equilibrium will satisfy the
following two conditions, where M∗ is the equilibrium number of leaders,
πk(M∗) ≥ F , πk(M∗ + 1) < F. (2.11)
Intuitively, these conditions apply that the last firm to become a leader should earn at least as much
profit as it would make remaining a follower.11 For equilibrium to hold, no more firms should
want to become a leader, which requires that the last firm considering entry would make a loss if it
entered as a leader.
Figure 2.4.1 illustrates the equilibrium number of leaders that operate in the two models over a
range of sunk costs and parameter values. Across specifications, the dominant firm model predicts
weakly more leaders operate in equilibrium. The higher price in equilibrium results in higher
leader profits. The opportunity to earn these profits instead of the zero profit the followers earn
11Recall in both the limit of the Cournot model and in the dominant firm model, each follower earns zero profit.
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of number of leaders in the two models over a range of sunk costs of
becoming a leader and parameters. Baseline parameters are a = 1, b = 0.5, φ = 0.5, and
F ∈ [0.1, 0.5]. Demand shock increases to a = 1.25, input shock increases to φ = 0.75.
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incentives firms to pay the cost to become a leader.
An increase in the level of demand, the comparison between panel (a) and (b), raises the equi-
librium price and potential profits for the leaders. These higher profits induce more entry by the
leaders all else equal. For example, when the sunk cost equals 0.1, there are 3 leaders in the lower
demand state and 5 in the higher demand state in the dominant firm model. The number of leaders
are 2 and 3 respectively in the Cournot model. Therefore, the relatively higher price in the domi-
nant firm model, makes the leaders’ entry decision more responsive to increases in demand in this
model. Because the profit available to a single leader is also greater, this model illustrates that
the firm has a greater incentive to take anti-competitive behavior to endogenously raise the cost of
becoming a leader.
I also consider exercises that increase the followers’ cost parameter, the comparison between
panel (a) and (c). Raising this cost decreases the competition from the followers and increases
the leader’s profits all else equal. This exercise illustrates that this change in costs can extend the
range of sunks costs for which a single firm can profitably operate as the leader. This increase in
the single firm leader illustrates that the leader also faces an incentive to behave anti-competitively
with respect to the followers cost. Such a strategy is an example of the abuse of dominance that
antitrust authorities consider when evaluating single firm behavior.
2.4.2 Discussion
Both supply side models considered in this paper predict that a single leader operates in equi-
librium over a range of parameters with the result depending on the sunk cost of becoming a leader.
This result on cost helps formalize the intuitive discussion of the dominant firm model in the lit-
erature in which a barriers to entry lead a single firm to gain an advantage but other firms prevent
this firm from fully exercising pricing power. The barrier to entry may either come from an exoge-
nous advantage or from anti-competitive practices to establish the dominant position. Because the
profit is higher all else equal in the dominant firm model, antitrust authorities should be more con-
cerned about these firm’s behavior when the followers are price-takers. I discuss several historical
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examples cited as dominant firms in light of the models developed above.12
Standard Oil represents an early example discussed in the antitrust literature of the dominant
firm. At Standard Oil’s greatest control of the market, the company controlled 90% of US oil
refining capacity. In the language of the free-entry model, the refining technology provides a
potential explanation for the production cost advantage for Standard Oil. Over time the growth in
demand for oil lead to an erosion of Standard Oil’s dominance with other firms acquiring significant
refining capacity and growing large enough to also act as leaders in the market for oil. As illustrated
in figure 2.4.1, growth in demand leads to an increased willingness of firms to pay the cost to
acquire refining capacity and gain a technological advantage. Buying control in upstream markets
to foreclose rivals is a form of abuse of dominance that antitrust agencies consider. The results
of the model suggest Standard Oil had strong incentives to preserve its high profits by behaving
anti-competitively as antitrust policy assumes.
Alcoa is another classic case that has been analyzed using the dominant firm model. In this
case, Alcoa controlled the bauxite mines required to produce virgin aluminum while its rivals
could only purchase and remanufacture recycled aluminum. Thus, the technological difference in
this setting involved the access to raw materials. Taking the cost of acquiring the recycled material
as the followers’ cost parameter, an increase in this parameter can be interpreted as the result of
a strategic supply incentives by Alcoa to soften future competition.13 Both models predict the
increase in profits caused by the price squeeze should lead more firms to enter producing new
sources of aluminum. The lack of entry suggests that the control of bauxite mines provided a high
barrier to entry with this cost being greater in the model in which the recycling companies are
fringe rather than Cournot competitors.
12In all these examples, alternative hypotheses have been proposed and tested in the literature. My purposes is to
add to the menu of models available for empirical researchers.




The dominant firm model has been widely used in empirical studies of pricing power. This
model’s tractability provides a convenient tool for researchers. Further, antitrust agencies have
long recognized that firms with a large share of the market are in a position to potentially abuse this
position. I show one can match key predictions using a game-theoretical quantity-setting model.
This model matches many of the key predictions of the dominant firm model: (i) one firm controls
a dominant position in equilibrium and faces a downward sloping demand curve, (ii) the other
firms have no individual impact on equilibrium price, and (iii) a large barrier to entry is required to
maintain the dominant firm’s position. However, the models differ in that the dominant firm model
has higher equilibrium prices across all specifications. This result occurs because price-taking
firms are less able to limit pricing power than small, strategic firms. The results of the models
suggest that the supply behavior of rival firms is important for evaluating strategic actions by a
firm with a dominant market share.
As empirical techniques become more powerful, my results suggest that future researchers
may be able to compare implications of supply behavior. Because different suppky side models
can provide similar predictions for the directions but not magnitude of equilibrium objects, di-
rect comparisons may help researchers chose between specifications with implications for policy.
Thus, econometric exercises such as those initiated by Bulow (1982) could be extended to other
asymmetric supply settings.
Several caveats are in order. First my results use a specific cost function for the followers
to generate the correspondence between the limit of the Cournot model and the dominant firm
model. A more general model of these firms’ cost seems a fruitful area of future study to allow
for other modes of competition. I also focus on quantity as the strategic variable in this model;
however, it would be interesting to see whether similar comparisons exist with price seting or
other strategic behavior. Recent empirical applications such as Miller, Sheu, and Weinberg (2018)
consider a price setting cartel competing against a competitive fringe suggesting other strategic
behavior can fit into the framework developed above. Finally, authors such as Ino and Kawamori
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(2009) have considered asymmetric cost equilibrium in homogeneous products under different
timing assumptions with the cost advantage comes from the realization of innovation. Their results
suggest alternative methods to generate cost asymmetry can provide a rich set of predictions for





Example of Model Under Specific Functional Forms
I use this model to demonstrate how recyclable materials affect firm behavior in an oligopoly.
I make the following assumptions for explication. I assume that the inverse demand for the final
good is linear, P (Q) = a − bQ, and that the costs, net of the recycling inputs, are quadratic
in supply, C1(qm) = c12 q
2
m , C̃2(qn) =
c2
2





m=1 qm,t). The cost of using secondary inputs for a firm j in period t is given
by Rq = φ ∗ (
∑N
n=1 qn,t/Q̄t−1)qj,t where φ is the parameter governing wholesalers’ production
efficiency. I study a two-period game in which firms cannot commit to supply paths and show how
the strategies of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game differ from a model with the same
primitives but in which firms to not account for the affect of current supply on future profit.
I solve the game backwards with each firm taking as given the stock of the recycled input from













The first order condition for this firm is






qj − c1qm = 0.






















qj − c2qn − (φ/Q̄1)((
N∑
j=1
qj) + qn) = 0.
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I solve for a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms of the same type use the same strategy.
In this equilibrium the best response functions are
qm(qn) =
a− bNqn
b(M + 1) + c1
qn(qm) =
a− bMqm
b(N + 1) + c2 + (φ/Q̄1)(N + 1)
.
The negative slope of best response functions shows that quantities are strategic substitutes as
required by the model. Solving the system of equations yields equilibrium strategies as a function
of the stock of recycled materials as
qm(Q̄1) =







The denominator of these expressions is
D = b2(M +N + 1) + b(N + 1)c1 + b(M + 1)c2 + c1c2 + (φ/Q̄1)(N + 1)(b(M + 1) + c1).
These strategies yield equilibrium flow profits
πm(Q̄1) =





2(2b+ c2 + 2(φ/Q̄1))
2D2
.
To check that the supply and profits of a primary (secondary) firm decreases (increases) I take
the derivative of the supply and profit of these firms. To keep the notation relatively simple I use






a(N + 1)f ′ ∗D − f ′ ∗ (N + 1)(b(M + 1) + c1)a(b+ c2 + f ∗ (N + 1))
D2
= f ′






−a(b+ c1)(N + 1)(b(M + 1) + c1)
D2
f ′ > 0.
Performing a similar exercise for the effect of stock on profits I sign ∂π1(Q̄)/∂Q̄ by signing
the numerator of this term. Signing this term follows from
2a2(2b+ c1)(b+ c2 + 2fφ(N + 1))f
′ ∗ φ(N + 1)2D2
−4φ(N + 1)(b(M + 1)c1)f ′ ∗Da2(b+ c1)2(2b+ c2 + 2fφ)
which simplifies to
f ′ ∗ 4a2(2b+ c1)φ(N + 1)D(b+ c2fφ(N + 1))b(b+ c1) < 0.
Thus, the profit of a primary firm decreases in the stock as claimed.
The sign of ∂π2(Q̄)
∂Q̄
is the same as the sign of
−f ′ ∗ 4a2(b+ c1)2φD(b2(1 +M +N + 2MN) + c1(c2N + fφ(N + 1)))
−f ′ ∗ 4a2(b+ c1)2φD(b(c1(N + 1) + (M + 1)(c2N + fφ(N + 1)))).
All the terms except for f ′ are positive; therefore, both the first and second terms have the same
sign as−f ′. This establishes that ∂π2(Q̄)
∂Q̄
> 0, so the profit of secondary firms increases as the stock
increases.
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Finally, notice that a primary firm’s first order condition in the first period is










where the last term in the expression is the derivative of the second period profit of the optimal
choice for any given stock of the input. The work above shows the value is a decreasing function
of the stock. Thus, the value of quantity that maximizes the expression is lower in the two-stage
game with recycling than in the asymmetric Cournot model as claimed.
Heterogeneous Goods
To study whether the result holds for markets with heterogeneous goods, I modify the base-
line model while maintaining the assumption of quantity setting. Consider a differentiated goods
oligopoly with firms choosing quantity as the strategic variable as in Singh and Vives (1984). The
system of (inverse) demand functions for a primary firm m and secondary firm n in this setting are














Using the results from the above proof, the effect of the recycled input on profits has the same sign
as in the homogeneous goods case if π1,2 ≤ 0. This condition holds if
πn1,2 = γ ≤ 0.
The condition to generate the result is intuitive. That is, if the products are imperfect substitutes,
the incentives to soften future competition are preserved in a heterogeneous good setting.
Incentives Preserved in Regional Model
Because the conditions necessary to demonstrate that the dynamic effects can generate similar
incentives in a model with regional trade are more complex, I illustrate this channel using specific
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functional forms to show that the results can still hold. The regional model adds two extra issues.
Shipping a good outside a firm’s home market requires the firm to pay a marginal shipment cost
t ≥ 0. The local government of each market, k, also sets its own subsidy for the purchase of
secondary goods that are purchased by consumers in that market, sk ≥ 0. I treat the subsidy as an
exogenous parameter in the firms’ problem; however, formally modeling the government problem
could endogenize this variable.
Consider the case of 2 markets with 1 primary and 1 secondary firm in each market k. I specify
the functional forms as Pk = Ak − bQk, Ci,k = ci,kqi,k, and Rk = rk(Q̄k)qi,k. Here i denotes
whether the firm is primary or secondary, k denotes the market, and rk denotes the recycled input
price in market k with r′ ≤ 0. I shut down purchasing power in the recycled input market in this
setup. I denote the supply of the primary firm located in market 1 to market k by xk k ∈ {1, 2},
the supply of the secondary firm located in market 1 by yk, the supply of primary firm located in
market 2 by zk and the supply of the secondary firm located in market 2 by wk.
This setup gives a system of 8 first order equations in 8 unknowns. The equilibrium supply for
the primary firm located in market 1 and supplying market 1 is
x1 =
A1(1 + s1)− 4c1,1(1 + s1) + c1,2 + c2,1(1 + s1) + c2,2 + r1 + r2 + t(2 + s1)
5b(1 + s1)
.
Similar expressions arise for the other seven supply functions. An increase in the stock of the
recycled input, in either market, reduces the cost of the input and hence increases the competition







and for a secondary firm
πy = b((1 + s1)y
2
1 + (1 + s2)y
2
2).
Taking derivatives of the profit functions with respect to each secondary input price gives the
claimed sign. Finally, as in the baseline model, the sign of the derivative of profit with respect to
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first period production plus the concavity of the profit function gives the claimed behavior.
Two new results arise by adding trade across markets. First, the enactment of a subsidy out-
side a firm’s home market leads to a change in supply, with secondary firms becoming relatively
more likely to supply the market with the subsidy. This implies that if one could observe the
actual flow of the good, the subsidy should result in secondary firms shipping relatively more to
that market. For datasets that do not include the shipment information, the result suggests that a
primary firm’s decision also should depend on the subsidies of all states. The other change is that
primary firms have an increased incentive to ship outside their home market. This result occurs
because the increase in stock of the recycled input is relatively less harmful to a primary firm if
this increase occurs in other market. The secondary firm would have to pay the transport cost to
supply the primary firm’s home market, so relatively more of the future competition occurs in the
other market.
Alcoa Model Implies Recycled Cost Satisfying Conditions
In this section, I establish that the recycling wholesaler model considered in the previous liter-
ature about Alcoa satisfies the assumptions of my theoretical model. Following Swan (1980) the
profit of a representative wholesaler is
πw = (Rρ(z)− z)Q̄
where R is the price received by wholesalers, the recycling technology is ρ(z), and z the inputs
used to produce the recycled input. I normalize the price of these inputs to 1. Thus, the wholesaler
choses its usage of inputs to maximize profits where an increase in inputs increases the share of the
stock of recyclable input that it recovers for sale to the secondary firms. I follow his discussion by
assuming ρ(z) is increasing and concave in input usage, and examine the case of ρ(z) = 1− e−kz.
Here k is a parameter governing the wholesalers’ efficiency.
Maximizing the wholesaler’s problem with respect to z and plugging back into the recycling
function gives the optimal rate ρ(z∗) = 1 − 1
kR
. Wholesalers recovery more as the price they
receive increases or they become more efficient. To derive the input cost function, I substitute this
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) =⇒ R = Q̄
k(Q̄−QS)
.
Finally, I establish that this expression satisfies the conditions from the theoretical model by
taking derivatives with respect to the stock of the input, the total secondary demand for the in-
put, and the derivative of the input cost for a secondary firm with respective to individual supply






































For each simulation exercise, I solve the model through backward recursion. For t = T suffi-
ciently far from the initial period, I solve the model for values of the stock over a large state space.
I then store the value of each firm’s profit in this period as that firm’s value in period t = T .
I then solve the problem in period t = T − 1 using a numerical approximation for the deriva-
tive of the value function. By choosing a sufficiently dense state space in the final period, I can
approximate this derivative with a high degree of accuracy. I again calculate the profit in period
t = T − 1 and form the value of the firm in that period as the maximum of the sum of the flow
profit and future value. This process is repeated until the problem is solved in the initial period. I
then forward simulate the path of play for a given initial value of the stock.
Across exercises this specification converges to a steady state relatively quickly and remains
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in the steady state until close to the end of the simulation. For example, with T = 15 and 1 firm
of each type, the model reached steady state within 5 periods of the start of the simulation and
remained in the steady state until 5 periods before t = T .
For the simulations of the myopic model, I solve the model in period t = T for the same
starting value of the stock as in the dynamic model and store the stock implied by the equilibrium
strategies of the fimrs. Because I assume firms behave myopically in this setting, I then resolve the
model with the stored value of the stock. Success iteration of this process generates the path, and
this process also enters a steady state after a few periods of play.
For the market power exercises, I use the values of equilibrium objects after the model reaches
the steady state. I calculate the percentage markup for an individual primary firm using the Lerner
index. Similarly, I calculate the HHI by summing the square of the market shares of all firms in
the steady state.
To generate the merger simulations, I first simulate the model to a steady state for a fixed
number of firms. I then exogenously impose a merger between a pair of primary firms. I assume
that the firms do not anticipate the merger, so that the firms set their new quantity post-merger using
the value of the stock prevailed pre-merger. I then forward simulate the model with the new market
structure. For the graphs, I normalize the value of the equilibrium outcome to 100 pre-merger, so
that I remove pre-existing differences in levels of variables.
The exercise is similar in the environmental simulation. Instead of imposing changes in market
structure, I change the value of the subsidy, tax, recycling rate and depreciation of the stock.
Similar to the merger exercises, I assume these policies are a shock, so that the firms do not
anticipate the change.
Tables and Figures
Price Taking is What Matters
To illustrate that the price-taking assumption is the key assumption leading firms to set higher
equilibrium price in the dominant firm model rather than the limit of the Cournot model, I compare
the price in the following cases to the limit price derived in section 2.2. I compare the result of i) the
limit of the Stackelberg model with N follower, and ii) a model with simultaneous quantity-setting
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Table A.1: Timing and Level of State Secondary Paper Subsidy Laws










































Figure A.1: % Difference HHI dynamic versus myopic holding the number of secondary firms
fixed at 1 and varying the number of primary firms.
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Table A.2: Company-Product Level Summary Statistics
Product Share Primary Avg. Capacity (tons/day) N
Coated Freesheet 94% 555 347
Coated Groundwood 100% 822 182
Kraft Paper 65.9% 456 463
Newsprint 76.8% 993 329
Tissue Paper 29.9% 228 1015
Uncoated Freesheet 84.5% 480 1127
Uncoated Groundwood 86.3% 289 287
Special Paper 85% 135 934
Corrugating Medium 45.2% 481 852
Linerboard 67.7% 1195 760
Solid Bleached Board 100% 1001 314
Recycled Paperboard 0% 271 1583
Note: All calculations at the product level. Share of primary and secondary calculated from FPL. For approximately
80% of these observations, the mill level and product level are the same. I adjust the remaining observations using the
product share as weights.
Table A.3: Recycled Input Input-Output Table
Recycled Input Final 1 Final 2 Final 3 Final 4 Final 5
Old Newsprint (ONP) NP
Old Corrugated Cardboard (OCC) LB CM
Mixed Paper (MP) CG UG SP KP SB
Pulp Substitute (PS) CF UF KP SB
Final Good Usage (%) ONP OCC MP PS
Newsprint (NP) 100 - - -
Coated Freesheet (CF) - - - 100
Uncoated Freesheet (UF) - - - 100
Coated Groundwood (CG) - - 68 32
Uncoated Groundwood (UG) - - 69 31
Tissue Paper (TP) 10 15 15 60
Kraft Paper (KP) - 85 10 5
Special Paper (SP) - - 29 71
Corrugating Medium (CM) - 95 5 -
Linerboard (LB) - 100 - -
Solid Bleached Board - - - -
Recycled Paperboard 14 61 16 9
Note: Information on relationship between inputs and final products based on industry sources such as Plant and
Steiker (1978) and author’s calculation.
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Table A.4: Regressions of Price on Capacity Level and Utilization Rate
NP GWP UF TP CP KP SP CM LB
Capacity 1.82*** 5.37*** 0.94*** 2.31*** 1.41*** -4.48*** 4.89*** 2.55*** 0.96***
(tons/100)
Utilization 0.013** 0.0034** -0.0017 0.014*** 0.013*** -0.012*** 0.0073 0.0079 0.0084
(%)
Observations 21 13 20 13 20 18 13 21 21
R-squared 0.856 0.939 0.770 0.923 0.884 0.829 0.573 0.720 0.832
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All calculations based on available aggregated data over the sample period. Capacity and capacity utilization
were available for the entire period. Price series are available for only a subset of years resulting in the different
number of observations.
Table A.5: Recycling Rate and Previous Production
(1) (2)




*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Regressions to estimate the recycling rate. Column (1) assumes the recycling process is i.i.d. over time and
column (2) assumes an AR(1) process. The outcome variable is the amount of the good recycled in the period.
Table A.6: Stock of Recycled Paper and the Recycling Rate
(1) (2) (3)




Recycling Input Price 0.026
(0.042)
Trend 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.020***
(0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0042)
Observations 21 21 20
R-squared 0.976 0.977 0.979
Note: Aggregate relationship between the stock of recycled inputs, recycling rates and recycled paper price.
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Table A.7: Regional Recycling Rate Shifters
(1) (2) (3)
Landfill Tipping Fee 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.72***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Input Demanded -0.00061** -0.00034
(0.00026) (0.00069)
Observations 96 96 96
R-squared 0.504 0.527 0.574
Regional FE No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Regressions on regional, consumer recycling rates on the regional landfill tipping fee and the total demand by
secondary firms for the recycled input.
Table A.8: Regional Variables
Region O to D D to O O to D D to O Wage GDP Wholesalers Population
Final (%) Final (%) Recycled (%) Recycled (%) ($/week) ($1000s) (Count) (/1000000)
North East 69.5 59.6 78.2 83.5 550 584.7 285 49.7
North Central 71.4 73.4 84.3 82.9 559 327.1 266 58.4
West 74.9 90.6 92.2 91.5 626 458 191 43.6
South 76.2 74.6 85.2 84.2 596 573.1 156 73.9
Note: O denotes the state of origination of a shipment and D the state of destination. The states in each regions are
defined below. West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. South: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
North Central: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin. North East: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. Shipment information calculated using the micro sample of the
Commodity Flows Survey (2012). Wage is the real weekly wage of paper industry workers for the state. Real GDP
and population are aggregated over all states in the region. State level counts of recycling wholesalers from the
Census.
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Table A.9: Parameters and Sources
Parameter Value Source
ψ 0.3 Estimated from data on recycling and production
b 0.5 Average inverse demand elasticity estimated in Pesendorfer (2003)
(c1, c2) (10,8) Cost ratio in Ince (1993) scaled to level of demand
a 100 Normalized demand intercept
δ 0.9 Estimated from data on supply and input usage





















Figure A.2: Total supply before and after merge. Pre-merger market structure 2 primary firms and
1 secondary firm.
between one strategic firm and a competitive fringe of price-takers.








This result holds if b > 0, so that demand slopes downward. Thus, s combination of timing and
smallness alone do not result in a higher price in the Stackelberg game. The strategic followers
are less accommodating than the price-takers even if these firms move second and are arbitrarily
small.
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Figure A.3: Primary Quantity: Tax Exercise








This expression holds because rearranging gives b > 0. Similar to the previous discussions in the
paper and the Appendix, the price-taking firms are more accommodation to strategic behavior by
the leader. The combination of these results is that it is the combination of smallness and price-
taking that results in the behavior that generates the higher equilibrium price in these models.
77









































Figure A.6: Illustration of how dynamics change best response functions and equilibrium supply.








Figure A.7: Illustration of how increase in stock affects input price.
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